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The Fourth Amendment's National
Security Exception: Its History
and Limits
L. Rush Atkinson 66 Vand. L. Rev. 1343 (2013)
Each year, federal agents conduct thousands of "national
security investigations" into suspected spies, terrorists, and other
foreign threats. The constitutional limits imposed by the Fourth
Amendment, however, remain murky, and the extent to which
national security justifies deviations from the Amendment's
traditional rules is unclear. With little judicial precedent on point,
the gloss of past executive practice has become an important means
for gauging the boundaries of today's national security practices.
Accounts of past executive practice, however, have thus far been
historically incomplete, leading to distorted analyses of its
precedential significance.
Dating back to World War II, national security investigations
have involved warrantless surveillance and searches-conduct
clearly impermissible in the traditional law-enforcement context-
authorized under the theory of a "national security" or "foreign
intelligence" exception to the Fourth Amendment. Out of a sense of
constitutional obligation, however, those who crafted this exception
also circumscribed it. Information derived from warrantless
searches was treated as inadmissible in subsequent trials, a caveat
that tempered the exception but also inhibited the conviction of spies
and other foreign agents. For decades, this "purely intelligence"
restriction, as FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover called it, served as the
constitutional boundary for agents working on national security
matters.
The FBI's "pure intelligence" precedent provides a useful lens
for studying the modern surveillance programs now subject to
constitutional litigation. As recently noted by the Supreme Court in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, it appears that no
information gathered by recent warrantless surveillance has been
used in criminal prosecutions. This adherence-conscious or
inadvertent-to a new, de facto pure intelligence rule has mimicked
the historical constraints placed on national security investigations.
Such parallelism bolsters claims that certain surveillance programs
can pass constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment's
national security exception without posing a threat to the traditional
safeguards of our civil liberties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2001, federal prosecutors have indicted and convicted
hundreds of defendants for terrorism, espionage, and other national
1344 [Vol. 66:5:1343
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security crimes.' And for every prosecution, there are dozens of
investigations into foreign threats that never result in a trial. Between
2001 and 2010, for example, the federal government obtained 16,306
foreign intelligence warrants in the course of its security operations. 2
Between 2004 and 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI")
issued 119,192 National Security Letters for records deemed to be
pertinent to national security investigations. 3
Despite these numbers, security investigations and
prosecutions proceed on uncertain constitutional footing. The rights of
terrorism suspects to receive Miranda warnings, 4 confront accusers, 5
and obtain civilian trials are unclear.6 Similar constitutional questions
surround the Fourth Amendment and its application to national
security matters. The balance between the Fourth Amendment's
protections and the President's inherent power to defend the nation
1. See, e.g., David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 1, 14 & n.47 (2011) ("Since 9/11, the DOJ has convicted hundreds of
defendants as a result of terrorism-related investigations."); CTR. ON LAW & SECURITY, N.Y.
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD 4 (2010), available at
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/documents/01_TTRC201OFinall.pdf (calculating 998
indicted defendants in terrorism-related prosecutions); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF
MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, TRADE SECRET AND EMBARGO-
RELATED CRIMINAL CASES (2012) (identifying over 250 cases of export and espionage cases
between 2007 and 2012); Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to Senators Patrick Leahy and Jeff Sessions 1 (Mar. 26, 2010) (on file with author) (citing
conviction of over 400 international terrorism defendants between 2001 and 2010).
2. See ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT COURT
ORDERS 1979-2012 (May 4, 2012), available at http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/
fisa.stats.html (compiling statistics based on annual Justice Department reports to Congress). In
2011 alone, the government obtained 1,745 orders. Id.
3. Id. National Security Letters, authorized under a variety of statutes, function in most
cases like administrative subpoenas, allowing authorized law enforcement to access certain
identified types of information. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RS22406,
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: A GLIMPSE OF THE
LEGAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT AMENDMENTS 5 tbl.1 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22406.pdf (summarizing different National Security Letter
statutes).
4. Charlie Savage, Holder Backs a Miranda Limit for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2010, at Al (reporting proposal to "carv[e] out a broad new exception to the Miranda [sic] rights"
in terrorism cases); see also Ryan T. Williams, Stop Taking the Bait: Diluting the Miranda
Doctrine Does Not Make America Safer from Terrorism, 56 LoY. L. REV. 907 (2010).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 238-41 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding Sixth
Amendment permits admission of video testimony by Saudi intelligence officials against
defendants); John Scott, "Confronting" Foreign Intelligence: Crawford Roadblocks to Domestic
Terrorism Trials, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1039, 1058-72 (2011) (exploring Confrontation
Clause's role in national security matters).
6. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2001) (arguing elements of tribunals are "flatly
unconstitutional").
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has become a focus of litigation in recent years yet still remains
murky.7
To clarify the constitutional parameters of national security
investigations, this Article examines the Fourth Amendment's
historical influence in security affairs.8 Claims about historical
practice pervade debates over modern surveillance programs,
including those about the Bush Administration's warrantless
wiretapping program and recent amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). These historical treatments
remain cursory, however,9 and have failed to detail how the Fourth
Amendment regulated national security operations in the pre-
September 11 era.
Archived materials reveal that the federal government has long
embraced the notion that national security constitutes an exception to
the traditional rules of the Fourth Amendment. Starting at the end of
World War II, federal agents investigating security cases began to
conduct warrantless electronic surveillance and physical searches on
the theory that a national security exception permitted this otherwise
unconstitutional conduct. 10 During the Cold War, leaders in the White
House and Justice Department relied on this same exception to
authorize aggressive surveillance of suspected foreign threats."
Tentative support from the judiciary in the late 1960s and 1970s
encouraged greater national security surveillance, in many cases
beyond the ordinary constitutional bounds imposed on law
enforcement.12
The national security exception, however, by no means gave
federal agents carte blanche investigatory power. Well into the 1970s,
the executive branch assumed that the national security exception
permitted only, in the words of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, "purely
7. See Paul Ohm, The Argument Against Technology-Neutral Surveillance Laws, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 1685, 1704 (2010) (noting unanswered questions about how "Fourth Amendment
appl[ies] to national security investigations"); see also infra Part I.B.
8. To date, more academic attention has been dedicated to the separation of powers
questions implicated in national security investigations. See, e.g., Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan,
The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR
Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (2008) (considering separation of powers relevance of
Roosevelt administration practice). This Article, however, focuses on a different question: the
constitutionality of executive conduct vis-A-vis the Fourth Amendment. That question is
sufficiently distinct that it deserves its own treatment.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.B.
12. See infra Part II.C.
[Vol. 66:5:13431346
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intelligence" focused investigations. 13 This "pure intelligence" rule
meant that evidence gleaned from warrantless searches and
surveillance was constitutionally inadmissible in subsequent
prosecutions-a limitation with important ramifications. On various
occasions, prosecutors concluded that the Fourth Amendment barred
the admission of evidence gleaned or derived from security
investigations at trial. Prosecutors elected not to present such
information; as a result, spies and foreign agents escaped conviction,
despite clear evidence of wrongdoing.14
Commentators who fail to identify the limits of these early
investigations overemphasize the government's power to investigate
foreign threats at the expense of liberty interests or, instead, dismiss
this period as lawless and irrelevant for purposes of legal precedent.
In reality, a clear legal framework regulated the scope of national
security investigations, and records reveal a palpable opinio juris-a
sense of legal obligation-that governed the constitutional boundaries
of security operations. This Article, contrary to some contemporary
assertions, shows that the Fourth Amendment played a pronounced,
restrictive role in early national security investigations, even in the
face of grave security risks. 15
The history described in this Article also bears directly on
lawsuits challenging the government's newest national security
surveillance programs, including the Supreme Court's recent case of
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA. 16 As explained below, civil
litigation has been stalled by the apparent fact that the government
has not used data collected from these surveillance programs in
subsequent criminal prosecutions.17 While this issue has only been
13. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI, for Attorney Gen. J. Howard McGrath
(Oct. 6, 1951), in ATHAN THEOHARIS, FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 137 (Ivan R.
Dee, Inc. 1993).
14. See, e.g., infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2.
15. See, e.g., BRUCE FEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL PERIL 121 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) (arguing
that early surveillance was not limited by "executive scruples about invading privacy or the
Fourth Amendment"); Matthew A. Anzaldi & Jonathan W. Gannon, In re Directives Pursuant to
Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Judicial Recognition of Certain
Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1599, 1601 (2010) ("For much of
the nation's history, the Executive Branch exercised largely unchecked discretion in gathering
foreign intelligence."); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1, 19 (2008) (arguing that "courts have largely debilitated the Fourth Amendment
to meet the demands of . .. the National Security State"); William Funk, Electronic Surveillance
of Terrorism: The Intelligence/Law Enforcement Dilemma-A History, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1099, 1104 (2007) (arguing that the "Fourth Amendment did not impose any obstacles to
electronic surveillance" before 1967).
16. 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142-43 (2013).
17. See infra Part IV.B.
2013] 1347
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discussed in the context of procedural matters-particularly
standing-this Article notes that it has substantive significance as
well. Limiting the use of collected information to nonprosecutorial
purposes strengthens the government's claim that its conduct to date
has complied with the Fourth Amendment by establishing a practice
parallel to the restraints imposed upon the early security
investigations. Even if the government never formally acknowledges
this limitation, the empirical evidence indicating restraint (i.e., the
vast amount of intelligence collected versus the marginal amount used
at trial) should assure courts that these new programs have not
eroded historical protections.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes national
security investigations, pending Fourth Amendment issues, and the
legal relevance of the executive's historical practices. Part III explores
the legal framework for earlier national security investigations,
focusing on the period between the end of World War II and the
passage of FISA in 1978. Specifically, Part III explains the origins of
the national security exception, the limits placed on this exception
(particularly the pure intelligence rule) and the consequences of those
limits (most notably, failed prosecutions). Part IV evaluates the legal
and policy merits of the pure intelligence paradigm and juxtaposes
early practice with that of modern surveillance programs.
II. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT QUESTIONS
Before assessing the historical record, this Article first provides
a background on national security investigations, the current debates
about their Fourth Amendment limits, and the relevance of history to
these debates.
A. The Unique Paradigm of National Security Investigations
National security investigations, as defined by federal
guidelines, mainly involve three types of threats: (1) "[i]nternational
terrorism," (2) "[e]spionage and other intelligence activities, sabotage,
or assassination, conducted by, for, or on behalf of foreign powers,
organizations, or persons," and (3) "[floreign computer intrusions."18
18. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI
OPERATIONS 7 (2008) [hereinafter AG. GUIDELINES]; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR FBI NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (U) 6-7 (2003). Previously, the government defined "national security
investigations" broadly in order to take advantage of the leeway afforded such operations. At
times, executive officials classified inquiries into organized crime, kidnappings, and political
1348 [Vol. 66:5:1343
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Federal practice governs national security investigations because they
share unique operational considerations not present in traditional
crime scenarios.19 These practical differences also require that
security investigations receive distinct legal treatment from
traditional law-enforcement investigations.
Law enforcement's ultimate goal, for example, is almost always
prosecution. Investigations might have other objectives-interdiction
of drugs, retrieving stolen property, and so on-but agents generally
envision convicting wrongdoers. 20  For security investigations,
however, the likelihood of prosecution remains remote. 21 Political
issues-a terrorism financier's presence overseas, a spy's diplomatic
immunity, among others-inhibit prosecutions. 22 Operational factors
dissidence as "security" investigations. See, e.g., The National Security Agency and Fourth
Amendment Rights: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Comm. to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 69 (1975) (statement of Edward
Levi) [hereinafter Levi, Church Committee Testimony], available at
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94thi/94intelligence-activitiesV.pdf (noting "internal
security or national safety" expanded to include "organized crime, kidnappings[,] and matters
wherein human life might be at stake"). Officials later jettisoned these broader terms after the
Supreme Court clarified that investigations into domestic threats (i.e., those not involving
"foreign powers or their agents") could not invoke the national security exception. United States
v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 309 n.8 (1972).
19. The national security exception generally involves federal, not local, investigations. In
United States v. Ehrlichman, the D.C. Circuit held "the 'national security' exemption can only be
invoked if there has been a specific authorization by the President, or by the Attorney General . .
. for the particular case." 546 F.2d 910, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1976). However, local law enforcement, of
course, plays a critical role in national-security cases. Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown
(Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2010) ("[Llocal police have once again emerged
as a significant constituency in discussions of national security."); Matthew C. Waxman,
National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 296 (2012) (describing
"expansion of subfederal roles" in counterterrorism efforts). While local efforts often operate
under certain other Fourth Amendment exceptions, these exemptions are distinct from the
broader national security exception. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmonds, 531 U.S. 32, 44
(2000) (suggesting "appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist
attack" would be constitutional); cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.21 (2001)
(noting checkpoint searches are a distinct subset of searches due to reduced expectation of
privacy).
20. This generalization has exceptions. See Herman Goldstein, Confronting the Complexity
of the Policing Function, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 49-50 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J.
Remington eds., 1993) (describing Chicago police practice of arresting gang members with "no
intention to prosecute").
21. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 36 (1978) ("Prosecution is one way, but only one way
and not always the best way, to combat [foreign threats]."); JOHN EARL HAYNES & HARVEY
KLEHR, EARLY COLD WAR SPIES 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (noting conviction "is only one
of the motivations of spy chasers, and not a very important one"); William C. Banks & M.E.
Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000)
("It is neither the objective nor the likely result that the target of a foreign intelligence ... search
will be criminally prosecuted.").
22. See Nathaniel P. Ward, Espionage and the Forfeiture of Diplomatic Immunity, 11 INT'L
LAw. 657, 658-59 (1977) (describing spies under diplomatic cover); Darren S. Tucker, Comment,
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also affect the calculus. Public trials risk exposing covert assets, 23 and
co-opting a spy may be more useful than jailing her.24 Such
considerations are not absent from traditional criminal investigations,
but they arise in spades in security matters.
More broadly, security investigations are not necessarily
premised on suspicion of criminal activity. Justice Department
guidelines explain that such operations are "not limited to
'investigations' in the narrow sense, such as solving particular cases or
obtaining evidence for use in particular criminal prosecutions. Rather,
these activities also provide critical information needed for broader
analytic and intelligence purposes ... ."25 These broader purposes
include diplomatic, military, and other foreign policy objectives.
Security investigations, therefore, are often "undertaken simply to
obtain information on the intentions, capabilities, and activities of
those able to harm the United States," rather than for prosecution. 26
Finally, security threats involve much greater potential costs
than everyday criminal enterprises. The costs of international
terrorism are obvious, as are those of espionage leading to the loss of
military and nuclear secrets. 27 The United States also loses billions of
dollars to state-sponsored economic espionage and cyberattacks. 28
While the Fourth Amendment traditionally operates
"transsubstantively"-applying the same rules regardless of the
The Federal Government's War on Economic Espionage, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1109, 1149
(1997) (noting how diplomatic immunity complicates counterespionage).
23. See SERRIN TURNER & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN TERRORISM
TRIALS 4 (2005), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/
20050000.TheSecrecyProbleminTerrorismTrials.pdf ('"The central challenge in using any
intelligence as evidence is finding a way to do so without burning extant intelligence assets.").
24. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 15, at 1105 n.30 (noting the FBI arrested Soviet spy Rudolf
Abel "only after failing to 'double' him").
25. A.G. GUIDELINES, supra note 18, at 16.
26. Funk, supra note 15, at 1105.
27. See, e.g., Jason Bram et al., Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New
York City, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV., Nov. 2002, at 5, 5 (estimating 2001 World Trade Center
attacks caused between $33 and $36 billion in property damage, $21.6 billion in clean-up costs,
between $3.6 and $6.4 billion lost to city industries, and $7.8 billion in decreased workers'
prospective lifetime earnings).
28. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-666T, CYBERSECURITY: THREATS
IMPACTING THE NATION 1 (2012) (noting "sustained cyber attacks ... could have a potentially
devastating impact on federal and nonfederal systems"). See generally KRISTIN M. FINKLEA &
CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42547, CYBERCRIME: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS AND U.S. LAw ENFORCEMENT (2013) (surveying types of cyberattacks and recent
cost estimates).
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suspected crime-this approach has been tested since the September
11 attacks. 29
For these reasons and others, national security investigations
are sufficiently unique for courts and executives to treat them
differently from run-of-the-mill law-enforcement operations. This
distinction has required developing a separate legal framework to
govern national security investigations: one that can accommodate
special governmental interests while honoring constitutional
guarantees.
B. The Current Uncertainty About Security Investigations
The growth of national security investigations has spurred new
Fourth Amendment challenges to government conduct. Defendants
facing terrorism- or espionage-related charges have objected to the
procedures by which the government collected its evidence. 30
Concerned citizens have brought civil lawsuits claiming that the
government transgressed Fourth Amendment bounds. 31 Corporations
have lodged other Fourth Amendment complaints when the
government sought to compel their assistance during national security
investigations.32
Many of these suits challenged amendments to the statutory
scheme regulating security surveillance, the centerpiece of which is
FISA.33 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which expanded FISA's
coverage, has been subject to dozens of separate challenges. 34 Though
29. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2146 (2002)
[hereinafter Stuntz, Policing After the Terror]; see generally William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill
Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842 (2001) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment].
30. See, e.g., infra notes 34 and 270 (listing challenges by defendants).
31. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2011) (considering a
challenge to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978); ACLU v. NSA, 493
F.3d 644, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2007) (considering a challenge to the NSA operation known as the
Terrorist Surveillance Program).
32. See, e.g., John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 2008) (challenging use of
National Security Letters); In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1007-08 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (considering challenge to
directives issued "assist in warrantless surveillance of certain customers").
33. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-85 (2012).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. El-
Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 563 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Abu-Jihad, 630 F.3d 102, 117 (2d Cir.
2010) (listing Fourth Amendment challenges); United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.
2009); United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 993 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Daly, 243 F.
App'x 302, 306 (9th Cir. 2007) (unpublished); United States v. Damrah, 124 F. App'x 976, 980
(6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Medunjanin, No. 10-CR-19-1(RJD), 2012 WL 526428, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2013] 1351
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most decisions affirm the PATRIOT Act's constitutionality, they have
not been unanimous. Two courts have concluded the Act violated the
Fourth Amendment, 35 and others have voiced their concern that the
Act's new standard "violates the Fourth Amendment."3 6
But FISA is not the only target of Fourth Amendment
challenges. After public disclosure of the Bush Administration's
Terrorist Surveillance Program, which involved warrantless
surveillance initiated outside of the FISA framework and done
without judicial approval,37 the ACLU challenged the program's
constitutionality.3 8 The judiciary has likewise scrutinized the
government's use of material witness warrants39 after the September
11 attacks. In one recent civil suit, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, three Justices
noted that the plaintiffs extended and invasive detention was "a grim
reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for
human dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in
perilous times." 40
2012); United States v. Alwan, No. 1:11-CR-13-R, 2012 WL 399154, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7,
2012); United States v. Mahamud, 838 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (D. Minn. 2012); United States v.
Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO, 2011 WL 3652524, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2011); United States v.
Sherifi, 793 F. Supp. 2d 751, 752 (E.D.N.C. 2011).
35. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1042 (D. Or. 2007) ('Therefore, I
conclude that 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1823, as amended by the Patriot Act, are
unconstitutional."), vacated by 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2009); In re All Matters Submitted to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 625 (FISA Ct.) (amending
minimization procedures under FISA), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736-37
(FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
36. United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 996-97 (D. Minn. 2008); see also United
States v. Islamic Am. Relief Agency, No. 07-00087-CR-W-NKL, 2009 WL 5169536, at *8 (W.D.
Mo. Dec. 21, 2009) ("Without deciding whether the 'significant purpose' test violates the
Defendants' Fourth Amendment rights, the Court finds, even if the primary purpose test applies,
it is satisfied in this case."). The PATRIOT Act expanded FISA's scope by allowing the
government to seek FISA warrants whenever "foreign intelligence information"-that is,
information about foreign threats-was a "significant" purpose. 50 U.S.C. § 1803. Prior to the
amendment, FISA had been understood to only apply to cases where the "primary" purpose of
the investigation was foreign intelligence information, thereby restricting its use in cases where
prosecutions was a likely outcome. See Cedric Logan, Note, The FISA Wall and Federal
Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 209 (2009).
37. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
38. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2007).
39. Material witness statutes allow the detention of a person considered to be "material" to
a criminal proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
40. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Though al-
Kidd's claim against the Attorney General was dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, a
district court judge permitted lawsuits against two officers responsible for obtaining the material
witness warrant to continue. al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-cv-00093-EJL-MHW, 2012 WL
4470776 (D. Id. Sept. 27, 2012).
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Legal challenges to new surveillance programs continue to this
day, 41 and questions about the Fourth Amendment's role in national
security abound.42 As one former Assistant Attorney General for
National Security acknowledged: "Although the courts have agreed
that the executive branch has a right to conduct surveillance and
searches for foreign intelligence purposes, developments . . . have not
substantially clarified the nature or scope of that right."43
C. The Constitutional Gloss of Early Executive Practice
To help address the uncertainty surrounding security
investigations, this Article surveys the historical boundaries of such
operations. The history examined here primarily involves executive
conduct, which can carry precedential weight in matters of
constitutional law.44 In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
Justice Frankfurter explained in his concurrence how executive
practice informs our constitutional understanding:
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to
uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure
of our government, may be treated as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the
President by §1 of Art. II.45
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have embraced the probative
value of longstanding executive practice. 46
When identifying the constitutional parameters of the
executive's power, historical moments of restraint are particularly
instructive. When congressional prohibition draws executive power to
its "ebb," for example, one can identify the executive's core
inextinguishable powers.47 Constitutional boundaries are similarly
discernible in some cases where the executive branch limits its own
41. See infra Part IV.B.2.
42. For an overview of some constitutional issues raised by new surveillance programs, see
William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1240-74 (2007).
43. DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS § 3.9 (Thomson/West Publ'g 2007).
44. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 715 (2008)
("[Nion-judicial actors produce precedents that are more pervasive than those made by courts in
constitutional law.").
45. 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
46. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008) (citing "executive gloss" theory); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (same).
47. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) (examining significance of
legislative restraints on president's war powers); see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38
(Jackson, J., concurring) (providing famous triptych-of-presidential-power theory).
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conduct. 48 Specifically, the executive's self-restraint is precedential
when it stems from a sense of constitutional obligation. 49 Such
executive branch fealty toward the Constitution might be unprompted
by a coordinate branch's action, so there may be no record as evident
as a judicial opinion or legislative bill. Nevertheless, where a
discernible opinio juris shapes executive action, we should consider
such legal opinion both for its persuasive power and for its reflection
of historical understandings about what protections the Constitution
establishes.50
Historical conduct is particularly important in the national
security context. "National security law and foreign affairs law,"
Julian Mortenson explains, have a "pronounced concern for post-
enactment history as a source of constitutional meaning." 1 Neil
Katyal and Richard Caplan note that "[i]n the crucible of legal
questions surrounding war and peace, few judicial precedents will
provide concrete answers," making executive practice one of the few
constitutional guides. 52
Accordingly, commentators and government officials have
deployed the historical record in defending or challenging the
constitutionality of national security investigations implemented in
the wake of the September 11 attacks. For example, when its
warrantless surveillance program became public in 2005, the Bush
Administration relied on historical precedent to defend its conduct.
"[I]t has long been recognized that the President has the authority to
use secretive means to collect intelligence necessary for the conduct of
foreign affairs and military campaigns," Attorney General Alberto
48. This topic is now receiving an increasing amount of scholarly attention. See generally
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal
Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013) (discussing executive reference to historical practice
as guide to limits on own power).
49. Of course, not all cases of executive restraint indicate constitutional parameters;
political, prudential, moral, and other considerations may govern conduct.
50. Opinio juris is a notion much more commonly discussed in relation to international law.
For example, that the customary practice of states cannot have legal force without evidence that
such practice is driven by a conviction that the law requires such conduct is a widely held notion.
See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2005). In the
domestic constitutional setting, evidence of opinio juris is not necessarily required for executive
restraint to amount to constitutional "gloss," but such evidence makes the underlying practice
more poignant.
51. Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 377, 378 (2011) (reviewing JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE
POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH (Kaplan Publ'g 2009); JOHN YOO, WAR
BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006);
and JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2006)).
52. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 8, at 1024.
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Gonzales urged. "Wiretaps for such purposes thus have been
authorized by Presidents at least since the administration of Franklin
Roosevelt in 1940."53 Similarly, the Justice Department has defended
legislative amendments to FISA by citing past practice. "From the
beginning of the 20th Century, the United States conducted
warrantless electronic surveillance for the purpose of protecting
national security from foreign threats," the government's brief stated
in a case challenging the PATRIOT Act's amendments to FISA.54
These historical accounts, however, have gone largely unvetted,
and the historical record is often misinterpreted due to the absence of
context. To illustrate, consider one of the main pieces of evidence cited
in debates about recent government surveillance programs and
alluded to by Attorney General Gonzalez in his statement quoted
above: an executive memorandum authored by Franklin Roosevelt in
May 1940.55 In this memorandum, Roosevelt "authorized and directed"
Attorney General Robert Jackson to permit federal officers to wiretap
"conversation[s] or other communications of persons suspected of
subversive activities against the Government of the United States,
including suspected spies."5 6 While Roosevelt's 1940 memorandum
certainly set a precedent for the use of wiretapping in national
security investigations, present-day commentators overlook the
memorandum's legal and historical context.57 When Roosevelt issued
53. Letter from Attorney Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales to Senator William H. Frist 7 (Jan. 19,
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/ surveillance9.pdf; see also U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 7 (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf ("[A] consistent understanding has developed that the
President has inherent constitutional authority to conduct warrantless searches and surveillance
within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. Wiretaps for such purposes thus have
been authorized by Presidents at least since the administration of Franklin Roosevelt in 1940.");
Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Senate and
Permanent Select Comms. on Intelligence 3 (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/terrorism/fisa/nsaletterl22205.pdf ("Presidents have long exercised the authority to
conduct warrantless surveillance for national security purposes . . . .").
54. Supplemental Brief for the United States, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct.
Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001), available at http://www.fas.org/irplagency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html.
55. Letter from Attorney Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales to Senator William H. Frist, supra note
53, at 7; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 6-10 (chronicling warrantless
surveillance under Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson).
56. Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt for Attorney Gen. Robert Jackson 2
(May 21, 1940), reprinted in Katyal & Caplan, supra note 8, at 1076-77.
57. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. Herbert Brownell Jr., Address at the University of Michigan
Lecture Course 8 (Mar. 2, 1954), available at http://www.justice.gov/aglaghistory/brownell
/1954/03-02-1954.pdf (defending wiretapping in security cases based on Roosevelt memorandum);
Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Tom C. Clark for President Harry S. Truman (July 17, 1946)
(recommending authorization of security wiretaps and quoting Roosevelt memorandum); cf.
Rejoinder by Mr. Hoover, 58 YALE. L.J. 422, 423 (1949) ("President Roosevelt had previously, on
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the memorandum, wiretapping was constitutionally unregulated. In
its 1928 decision Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it
required no trespass.58 Of course, the Court overruled Olmstead in its
1967 decision Katz v. United States.59 But even before Katz, statutory
restrictions circumscribed the use of wiretapping information 60-a fact
generally omitted by current commentaries. Without an
understanding of this context, however, Roosevelt's memorandum
garners greater precedential weight today than it ought to receive.
Historical accounts to date have been one-sided affairs,
emphasizing the breadth of the executive's conduct without
considering whether any constraint-external or self-imposed-
limited such action.6' These accounts wrongly imply that the Fourth
Amendment fails to regulate national security investigations. In truth,
as this Article explains, the Fourth Amendment figured prominently
in regulating national security efforts in the post-World War II and
Cold War eras, and both Justice Department and White House leaders
sought to honor the Amendment's constitutional protections.
May 21, 1940, authorized the Attorney General to approve wire tapping [sic] when necessary
involving the defense of the nation.").
58. 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928) (noting wiretaps "were made without trespass upon any
property of the defendants").
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594, 616-17 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting "Supreme Court's unfortunate decision in Olmstead" means
"[e]xecutive practice must be considered in its historical context, which illustrates why the 30-
year policy of presidentially directed electronic surveillance has no substantial bearing on
whether the practice of warrantless surveillance is now constitutional").
60. See infra notes 171-177 and accompanying text (describing statutory bar to
prosecutorial use of wiretapping information).
61. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 92 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (noting
"government had long engaged in wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance" and
"had done these things without seeking warrants or trying to confine surveillance to situations in
which there was probable cause"); William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless
Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth
Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 103 (1985) ("Warrantless electronic surveillance has been
used by the Executive to collect intelligence information since at least the mid-
1800's .... Warrantless physical searches have been used for a much longer period of
time .... ); Viet D. Dinh & Wendy J. Keefer, FISA and the PATRIOT Act: A Look Back and a
Look Forward, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. at iii, vi (2006) ("[Wlith the exception of some
curtailment of the use of wiretaps in the latter portion of the Johnson Administration,
warrantless electronic surveillance was regularly used ... for purposes of national
security. . .. "); Funk, supra note 15, at 1102-03 ("Presidents have authorized various forms of
electronic surveillance for intelligence purposes since at least Franklin Roosevelt."); Gregory E.
Birkenstock, Note, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Standards of Probable Cause:
An Alternative Analysis, 80 GEO. L.J. 843, 843 (1992) ("Electronic wiretapping, which law
enforcement and national security agencies have practiced for almost as long as there have been
wires to tap . . ").
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III. EARLY NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
National security investigations are not a recent phenomenon;
the United States has investigated foreign threats since the founding.
In 1797, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering hired a private agent to
investigate a conspiracy between the British Navy and Senator
William Blount.62 The Lincoln Administration, suspicious of
Confederate sympathizers, oversaw the creation of the first
intelligence-collection agency, headed by Allan Pinkerton.63 By the
early twentieth century, the newly established FBI spearheaded
domestic investigations of foreign threats, a responsibility it
maintains today.64
Despite the long history of security investigations, a unique
legal framework for such operations did not develop until after World
War II. Facing a need to ensure that national security investigators
had sufficient operational leeway in the postwar era, executive branch
officials began to theorize about a "national security exception" to the
Fourth Amendment. Even as the national security exception
developed, however, the Fourth Amendment continued to circumscribe
security investigations. Specifically, while executive branch officials
condoned the warrantless use of invasive investigative techniques,
they also barred the use of evidence obtained through such
techniques-a restriction this Article refers to as the "pure
intelligence" rule. Over time, the pure intelligence rule became the
most important constitutional boundary for investigators handling
security cases during the Cold War.
Part III examines the Cold War era of national security
investigations, which can be subdivided into three distinct periods.65
During the first period, surveyed in Part III.A, federal agents
employed invasive investigative techniques, despite misgivings by
government lawyers about the constitutionality of such conduct. When
these invasive techniques revealed condemning evidence of espionage
and other crimes, prosecutors refused to use it at trial, even at the cost
62. See SAMUEL EDWARDS, BARBARY GENERAL: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. EATON 54-55
(Prentice-Hall 1968) (describing investigation into plot); BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST
IMPEACHMENT 93 (Mercer Univ. Press 1998) (describing plot).
63. See EDWIN C. FISCHEL, THE SECRET WAR FOR THE UNION 53 (Mariner Books 1996);
DONALD E. MARKLE, SPIES AND SPYMASTERS OF THE CIVIL WAR 9 (Hippocrene Books 2004).
64. See Banks & Bowman, supra note 21, at 23 (noting by World War II, Bureau of
Investigation "had assumed domestic counter intelligence responsibilities").
65. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, S. REP. NO. 94-
755, at 22 (1976), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94thl94755_II.pdf
(describing "three broad periods" marking "expansion of domestic intelligence activity').
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of acquittals. The resulting equilibrium-a de facto pure intelligence
rule-was more consequence than theory, but it served as an
important precedent for later operations. The second and third periods
operated under a more stable legal rubric. In the second period,
examined in Part III.B, the Justice Department authorized the use of
certain invasive surveillance techniques, beginning with microphone
surveillance, under the theory that national security provided an
exception to traditional Fourth Amendment rules. The third period,
outlined in Part III.C, witnessed the broadening of the national
security exception in two ways: the exception (1) became tentatively
embraced by the judiciary and (2) was expanded to cover other
"Fourth Amendment techniques" ordinarily requiring a warrant and
probable cause.66 The exception, however, remained purely
intelligence based, with the executive branch defending its conduct by
emphasizing the exception's circumscribed, nonprosecutorial nature.
This Part contextualizes the origins of the Fourth
Amendment's national security exception and the early executive
practices often cited in today's debates about the Fourth Amendment
and foreign affairs. While early security investigations operated under
a flexible constitutional framework, the Fourth Amendment
nonetheless constrained the government in impactful ways that are
often forgotten or ignored.
A. The De Facto National Security Exception: 1945-1954
In 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt designated the FBI as
the primary civilian body responsible for the "investigation of all
espionage, counter espionage, and sabotage matters."67 These new
66. A word about methodology is in order. To trace the Fourth Amendment's role in early
security investigations, this Article primarily examines the context in which the federal
government employed "Fourth Amendment techniques"-tactics that normally require the
issuance of a judicial warrant. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. William French Smith, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Remarks Before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council 37 (Dec. 18, 1981), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/smith/1981/12-18-1981.pdf (identifying "[F]ourth
[A]mendment techniques" such as seizures, wiretapping, bugging, and closed-circuit monitoring).
Particularly during the period examined here, the scope of qualifying "Fourth Amendment
techniques" changed significantly. Evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (moving from a
trespass-based theory to a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy model) had operational significance,
altering what was or was not constitutionally regulated. Because this Article is concerned
foremost with executive practice in the face of constitutional restraints, the Author accounts for
this dynamism, and pertinent changes in Supreme Court doctrine are noted in the chronological
discussion.
67. Directive from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI (June 26,
1939); see also G. Gregg Webb, New Insights into J. Edgar Hoover's Role, 48 STUD. INTELLIGENCE
45, 46-47 (2007), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence
/kent-csilvol48nol/pdf/v48ila05p.pdf (quoting directive).
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responsibilities, however, spurred a number of legal questions about
the Fourth Amendment's role in national security investigations.
Rather than working off a well-formed policy, practice was forged
through series of discussions between the FBI and Justice Department
attorneys faced with prosecuting national security crimes.
1. Early Investigative Techniques and Constitutional Red Flags
To fulfill its new "general intelligence" function,68 the FBI
began training its agents in surreptitious surveillance. Starting in the
1940s, the FBI formed the "Sound School" where agents learned how
to electronically intercept telephone calls and other communications. 69
An FBI technician also taught agents "lock studies" to facilitate break-
ins. 70 As a sign of Allied cooperation, British intelligence officers
instructed six FBI agents in the art of chamfering (surreptitious mail
opening) in order to help the Bureau launch its own wartime mail-
opening program.71
The Bureau's various new techniques, however, placed it in
uncertain legal waters, particularly as World War II ended. 72 One
controversial technique was microphone surveillance, commonly called
"bugging,"73 where agents would place an electronic listening device
near the targeted individual to collect sounds in the surrounding
area.74 The FBI began employing microphone surveillance in 1940 to
68. In 1936, Hoover and Roosevelt discussed means by which the Bureau might collect
"general intelligence information" pertaining to national security investigations. S. REP. NO. 94-
755, at 25.
69. CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND His SECRETS 286 (W.W. Norton & Co.
2001) ("Wiretapping and bugging were taught at the FBI's 'Sound School' .... ).
70. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 355 (1976), available at http://www.
intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94thl94755_III.pdf (describing "lock studies").
71. RICHARD E. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 90 (Univ. of Texas Press 1980); W.
THOMAS SMITH, JR., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 100 (Facts on File
2003) ("British Intelligence operatives actually perfected [chamfering] prior to World War II and
began to teach special agents of the [FBI] how to get into the mail of Axis diplomats.").
72. See HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 21, at 12 ("As the sense of wartime emergency
receded, attitudes regarding what was legal and illegal in security investigations were in flux.").
73. DAVID WISE, THE AMERICAN POLICE STATE 150 (Vintage Books 1976) ("From the very
start, the necessity of breaking and entering to plant a microphone caused nagging intellectual
and legal problems for the Department of Justice.").
74. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.1 (1979) (describing "bugging" as
"interception of all oral communication in a given location," which is "accomplished by
installation of a small microphone in the room to be bugged and transmission to some nearby
receiver").
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investigate espionage cases.75 Bugged facilities allegedly included
foreign embassies, 76 hotels believed to be used by spies,77 and certain
brothels-the latter purportedly in the hopes of catching diplomats in
compromising acts and leveraging this information to turn them into
informants.78
At the time, though, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence raised serious constitutional questions about these
bugging operations. Installing the bug often required government
agents to trespass into a suspect's constitutionally protected private
arena, but this type of trespass rendered a surveillance operation
illegal under the Court's precedent. 79 Decisions like Olmstead v.
United States80 in 1928 and Goldman v. United States81 in 1942
permitted nontrespassory forms of electronic surveillance, but these
opinions also implied that a physical trespass was the sine qua non of
a Fourth Amendment violation. 82
Existing Court decisions also generated concerns about various
physical searches the FBI was employing.83 During the course of
national security investigations, the Bureau conducted what it
referred to as "black bag jobs": clandestine entries into homes, offices,
and other protected places for a variety of purposes, such as
photographing or seizing documents. 84 Black bag jobs, however,
75. FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 132.
76. GERALD K. HAINES & DAVID A. LANGBART, UNLOCKING THE FILES OF THE FBI: A GUIDE
TO ITS RECORDS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 252 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1993) ("In
1941 the FBI installed a number of surveillance taps on embassies and individuals despite the
[great] reluctance of recently appointed Attorney General Francis Biddle to grant such
authorization.").
77. See GENTRY, supra note 69, at 286 (noting "[m]any of the major hotels ... and some of
the chains .. . were especially accommodating, assigning subjects to prebugged rooms").
78. Id. at 286-87.
79. FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 132.
80. 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928) (noting wiretaps "were made without trespass upon any
property of the defendants").
81. 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (noting "that the trespass did not aid materially in the use
of the detectaphone").
82. Memorandum from William Olson, Assistant Att'y Gen. for Internal Sec., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Attorney Gen. Elliot Richardson, National Security Electronic Surveillance History,
Policy and Procedure, 1924-73, at 23 (undated) ("[A]s of the date of the Goldman decision, the
test for the validity of a microphone surveillance was established to be whether or not it involved
a trespass."); National Security Electronic Surveillance History, Policy and Procedure, 1924-73,
reprinted in Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance-1 974: Joint Hearing Before S.
Comm. on the Judiciary and S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong. 23 (1974).
83. Today, FISA defines a "physical search" as "any physical intrusion ... into premises or
property ... intended to result in a seizure, reproduction, inspection, or alteration of information,
material, or property. .. ." 50 U.S.C. § 1821(5) (2012).
84. Although the FBI occasionally counted surreptitious entries to install microphones as
"black bag jobs," it largely treated entries for bugging operations as legally distinct from other
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usually involved warrantless trespasses into constitutionally protected
areas, raising the same concerns as bugging operations. Another type
of constitutionally suspect technique involved the chamfering and
photographing of sealed mail, a type of personal property that the
Supreme Court held was constitutionally protected as early as 1878.85
As the FBI's warrantless investigative techniques gave rise to
constitutional questions, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sought
guidance on their legality by submitting a series of "hypothetical
questions" to the Justice Department.86 However, the Justice
Department's responses failed to assuage the Bureau's concerns. In
1944, Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,
wrote to Hoover about physical searches, explaining that "[t]he secret
taking or abstraction of papers or other property from the premises
without force is equivalent to an illegal search and
seizure ... . Consequently, such papers or other articles are
inadmissible as against a person whose rights have been violated." 7
Assistant Attorney General T. Lamar Caudle issued similar warnings
concerning microphone surveillance in December 1946, writing to
Hoover "that where there has been a physical trespass upon the
premises occupied by the defendant ... ,the evidence obtained by that
means would be inadmissible on the ground that it was obtained by an
illegal search and seizure."88
surreptitious entries. Accordingly, this Article does not include bugging entries in its definition of
"black bag job." See also SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 355 n.1 (1976),
available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94th/94755_III.pdf (defining "black bag job"
as "warrantless surreptitious entries for purposes other than microphone installation, e.g.,
physical search and photographing or seizing documents").
85. Id. at 561-677 (discussing domestic CIA and FBI mail openings); see also United States
v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970) ("It has long been held that first-class mail such as
letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage . . . is free from inspection by postal
authorities, except in the manner provided by the Fourth Amendment."); Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding sealed mail in transit to be protected).
86. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MICROPHONES: POLICY BRIEF 9
(Aug. 17, 1966) (describing "pattern of presenting hypothetical situations" to Justice
Department).
87. Memorandum from Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, for J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI (July 4, 1944), quoted in S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 366-67.
Possibly to avoid any adverse response, when he decided to use bugs during espionage
investigations, Hoover did not brief the Justice Department further or seek the Attorney
General's approval. FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 132.
88. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 86, at 9-10 (quoting brief). In his July 1944
memorandum to Hoover, Holtzoff misinterpreted the Court's Goldman decision, concluding that
"[m]icrophone surveillance is not equivalent to illegal search and seizure" and that "evidence so
obtained should be admissible" even where "an actual trespass is committed." Memorandum
from Alexander Holtzoff for J. Edgar Hoover, supra note 87; see also S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 294
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Despite these constitutional red flags, the FBI continued to
habitually use bugging, black bag jobs, and mail openings during the
course of its security investigations. FBI records reveal hundreds of
microphone surveillances conducted in the years immediately
following World War 11.89 The Bureau's mail-opening programs were
even more dramatic in scope, with federal agents establishing
chamfering centers across the country to inspect thousands of
letters. 90 Indeed, warrantless investigative techniques became an
integral part of the FBI's postwar security operations.
2. Failed Prosecutions and Operational Responses
Though constitutional questions did not stop the FBI from
employing warrantless investigative techniques, the Fourth
Amendment limited national security operations in other ways. In a
series of high-profile espionage trials, federal prosecutors concluded
they could not present their best evidence to the jury because those
materials had been gleaned from warrantless investigations. The
result was a series of failed national security prosecutions, much to
the embarrassment of the FBI and Justice Department.
The first evidentiary issue arose during the Amerasia trials. In
1945, the Office of Strategic Services (the Central Intelligence
Agency's precursor) learned that individuals at the magazine
Amerasia, a publication sympathetic to Chinese Communism, had
obtained classified materials on Chinese-U.S. affairs.91 Federal agents
broke into the magazine's offices and discovered hundreds of protected
government documents. 92 This black bag job was followed by months
n.74; id. at 367 ("[T]he Goldman decision did not support Holtzoff's conclusion, since the
microphone surveillance in the case did not involve trespass; and the Court did not address the
question of microphone surveillance accomplished by surreptitious entry."). Holtzoff's opinion
might have constituted a legal coup for the FBI, but the Bureau does not appear to have actually
relied on the errant analysis.
89. See Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 68 (noting FBI records show
hundreds of microphone surveillances were conducted between 1945 and 1952). These numbers
do not account for the difference between trespassory and nontrespassory bugging, but other
records confirm the FBI never abandoned trespassory bugging during this period. See infra note
119 and accompanying text.
90. Between 1940 and 1973, the CIA (or its precursor) and the FBI conducted a total of
twelve mail-opening programs; in one program, agents intercepted, opened, and photographed
more than 215,000 communications. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 561.
91. See HARVEY KLEHR & RONALD RADOSH, THE AMERASIA SPY CASE (Univ. of North
Carolina Press 1996); see also HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 21, at 25-34 (describing Amerasia
investigation).
92. As one agent later testified to Congress about the Amerasia investigation: "I don't offer
any apologies for the method of entering a property [i.e., the Amerasia offices] without due
process of law. I am well aware of the restrictions. I decided to take the course of action because
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of warrantless wiretapping and bugging.93 Through one such bug,
agents overheard two suspects reveal they had obtained classified
materials from Harry Dexter White, the Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury.94 Wiretaps and bugs also recorded John Stewart Service, a
State Department official, offering to leak diplomatic materials.
In June 1945, agents arrested six suspects in connection with
the Amerasia ring.95 Prosecutors, however, immediately decided that
little, if any, of the government's evidence was admissible, given the
use of warrantless bugging, wiretapping, and black bag jobs.96 With
prosecutors refusing to use information tainted by constitutionally
suspect techniques, they dropped all charges against four defendants
and pled the remaining two to counts with no jail sentences.97 As a
result, the Justice Department never charged Harry Dexter White or
two other identified spies, Joseph Bernstein and Thomas Bisson.98 The
first major spy prosecution of the postwar era, put simply, collapsed
based in part on the executive's conclusions about the Fourth
Amendment's continuing influence, even on national security
investigations. 99
of the necessities." H.R. Res. 430, 79th Cong. (1946), published in 96 CONG. REC. 7438 (daily ed.
May 22, 1950) (testimony of Mr. Brooks).
93. Id. at 7439 (testimony of Mr. Brooks) (testifying FBI "tapped the telephones," "entered
the premises," and "photostated all of the documents" in office); KLEHR & RADOSH, supra note 91,
at 84 (noting bugging of telephones and hotel rooms).
94. KLEHR & RADOSH, supra note 91, at 52.
95. Id. at 34. One suspect's discovery of the FBI's hidden microphone apparently accelerated
the decision. Id. at 84.
96. During a later congressional hearing on the Amerasia affair, Justice Department
lawyers explained that the Office of Strategic Service's conduct was perceived to be so
egregious-the chief prosecutor suggesting agents had "burglarized" Jaffe's office-that
prosecutors avoided consulting with the Office in order to avoid tainting their case. 96 CONG.
REC. at 7452 (testimony of Mr. McInerny); see also id. (statement of Mr. Hitchcock) (explaining
"it was impossible to use that in court" which had come when "the Office of Strategic Services got
into Jaffe's office"); id. at 7436 (statements of Reps. Hobbs and O'Sullivan) (suggesting "all of the
evidence produced in the Amerasia case [grew] out of ... unlawful searches and seizures").
97. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 21, at 37.
98. Id. at 38; KLEHR & RADOSH, supra note 91, at 84 (noting "investigators would never
have known about Bernstein were not it for their electronic eavesdropping, so ... any evidence
seized might still be inadmissible in court under the 'fruit of the poisoned tree' principle"); JOHN
EARL HAYNES & HARVEY KLEHR, VENONA 177 (Yale Univ. Press 1999) ("Although the FBI
believed that Bernstein was a Soviet agent, it never arrested him . . . perhaps because the
evidence gained by bugging was inadmissible in court."). White was also implicated by the
testimony of Elizabeth Bentley, another Soviet spy who turned informant for the United States
in 1945. White died in 1948, shortly after Bentley publicly testified about his Soviet relationship
before the House Un-American Activities Committee. See generally R. BRUCE CRAIG,
TREASONABLE DOUBT: THE HARRY DEXTER WHITE SPY CASE (Univ. Press of Kansas 2004).
99. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 21, at 44 (noting the "first major espionage case of the
postwar era ... fizzled out because of evidentiary problems and political interference"); see also
Michael Wreszin, "Gee but I'd Like to Be a G-Man," 20 REVS. AM. HIST. 258, 260 (1992)
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Prosecutors faced the same evidentiary hurdle in the case of
Joseph Weinberg. A graduate student of renowned physicist J. Robert
Oppenheimer, Weinberg was selected to work on the U.S. nuclear
weapons program commonly known as the "Manhattan Project." 00 In
1943, however, a warrantless FBI bug in the home of Steve Nelson, a
political commissar of the Communist Party USA, recorded Weinberg
offering to help the Soviet Union and disclosing a variety of specialized
information about nuclear technology. 01 In 1949 hearings, the House
Committee on Un-American Activities publicly identified the
espionage incident and formally recommended that the Justice
Department prosecute Weinberg for espionage.102 The government
finally indicted Weinberg in 1952 for perjury based on his sworn
testimony denying membership in the Communist Party. The primary
evidence proving his perjury (and his espionage), however, was
obtained through the warrantless bug in Nelson's home. The Justice
Department concluded that the evidence was inadmissible. 03 With the
government obligated to withhold its smoking gun, a jury acquitted
Weinberg-another embarrassing result covered on the front pages of
the national newspapers.104
Cases like the Amerasia and Weinberg trials indicated that the
use of warrantless investigative techniques could jeopardize
subsequent trials, so the FBI and Justice Department began to shape
investigations with these evidentiary issues in mind. In 1949, the FBI
internally decided to avoid using electronic surveillance in any
criminal case likely to go to trial.105 Hoover also imposed new filing
procedures (codenamed "June") that compartmentalized all sensitive
information, including intelligence collected from bugs, physical
(reviewing GENTRY, supra note 69) ("In the Amerasia espionage case the FBI's illegal
burglarizing, planted bugs, black bag jobs, tapped phones and surreptitious entry allowed the
principals in the case to escape conviction.").
100. HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 21, at 146-47.
101. Id. at 148.
102. Named 'Scientist X,' He Denies Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1949, at 1, 4. In 1948, a
HUAC report had disclosed the espionage incident but did not identify Weinberg, only referring
to the culprit as "Scientist X." Text of Report by the House Committee on Un-American Activities
Relating to Atomic Espionage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1948, at 22 (reproducing report in full).
103. JOHN EARL HAYNES, HARVEY KLEHR & ALEXANDER VASSILIEV, SPIES: THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE KGB IN AMERICA 121 (Yale Univ. Press 2009) (noting "the most damning
evidence. . .had been gathered by warrantless wiretaps and bugs" and "[t]he Justice
Department.. . opposed prosecution because of evidentiary problems").
104. Weinberg Acquitted, 9 BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 94, 94 (1953); Weinberg Is Freed on
Perjury Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1953, at 1.
105. HAINES & LANGBART, supra note 76, at 253 (describing recommendation by FBI
Associate Director Clyde Tolson approved by Hoover).
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searches, and similar constitutionally suspicious techniques.106 Field
agents were ordered not to keep their own records of electronic
surveillance or black bag jobs but rather to send them to Washington
for maintenance in the separate system.107 Aside from ensuring
Hoover's control over potentially sensitive information, these
procedures reduced the chance that bugging and tapping reports
might taint FBI files that would later be used in criminal
prosecutions.108
3. A Proposed and Rebuffed Constitutional Exception
At a June 1950 meeting of FBI executives, officials
acknowledged that the Bureau was installing and using microphones
''on its own authority-without any authorization from the [Justice]
Department-and must assume responsibility for them if the issue of
their legality were raised at any time."109 Fears of microphone
surveillance tainting impending prosecutions of Communist Party
leaders under the Smith Act further compounded the Bureau's risk of
political exposure. 10 These worries prompted Hoover to abandon his
past practice of posing Cheshire hypothetical questions to Justice
Department lawyers.111 In October 1951, Hoover penned a
memorandum to Attorney General J. Howard McGrath setting out the
operational details of the FBI's national security investigations,
including trespassory bugging. "As you know, in a number of instances
it has not been possible to install microphones without trespass," he
106. ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE FBI: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 31 (Greenwood
1999) [hereinafter THEOHARIS, REFERENCE]. As early as 1940, Hoover had created records
systems that centralized information and allowed particularly sensitive information to be more
easily maintained and, if needed, destroyed without attracting notice. ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE
"Do NOT FILE" FILE, at v (1989), available at http://cisupa.proquest.com/ksc assets/catalog/
10754_FBIFileTheDoNotFile.pdf.
107. See THEOHARIS, REFERENCE, supra note 106, at 31 ("[R]eports were to be routed to the
Special File Room at FBI headquarters to be 'maintained under lock and key.' "). Reports of such
physical searches were marked as being sensitive collection; the reports were nonserialized,
permitting their surreptitious destruction. ATHAN THEOHARIS, SPYING ON AMERICANS: POLITICAL
SURVEILLANCE FROM HOOVER TO THE HUSTON PAPERS 126 (Temple Univ. Press 1978)
[hereinafter THEOHARIS, SPYING].
108. RONALD KESSLER, THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE FBI 432 (St. Martin's
Paperbacks 2003) ("Under Hoover's system, because microphone surveillance entailed break-ins,
tapes of such surveillance were kept separately from the cases. Because the surveillance involved
illegal entry, the material was to help generate leads and not to be used as evidence in court.").
109. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 86, at 14-15 (emphasis omitted).
110. Id. at 16-17.
111. See FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 132 (noting Hoover
did not brief Attorney General on FBI bugging activities until Smith Act cases).
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wrote. 112 Hoover sought "a definite opinion ... as to whether ... we
should continue to utilize this technique [i.e., microphone surveillance]
on the present highly restricted basis [i.e., security matters only], or
whether we should cease the use of microphone coverage entirely in
view of these issues currently being raised."113
McGrath refused to provide Hoover with the legal comfort he
sought. In his February 1952 reply, McGrath concluded that
trespassory bugging, even in national security matters, violated the
Fourth Amendment. 114 Buggings that "involve trespass are in the area
of the Fourth Amendment, and evidence so obtained and from leads so
obtained is inadmissible," the Attorney General wrote.115 Accordingly,
McGrath refused to bless trespassory bugging operations: "[P]lease be
advised I cannot authorize the installation of a microphone involving a
trespass under existing law."11 6
McGrath's memorandum approached a formal rejection of the
notion that national security constituted an exception to the Fourth
Amendment. As a result, it momentarily shifted FBI operations.
Hoover informed Bureau officials in March 1952 that he would no
longer approve microphone surveillance requests requiring a trespass,
even for national security purposes.117 The number of FBI microphone
surveillances dropped by approximately one-third over the next two
years, a trend attributable to the curtailing of trespassory bugging
even though nontrespassory bugs remained permissible.118
But despite McGrath's memorandum, some trespassory
operations apparently continued. In a 1954 FBI memorandum, one
official mentioned "a few instances wherein we had ... utilized
microphone surveillances" after the ban.119 Hoover's own records
hinted that trespassory bugging continued, though he claimed to have
received Justice Department approval. In a memorandum for his files,
112. See id. at 137 (quoting Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover for Attorney Gen. J. Howard
McGrath, supra note 13).
113. Id. (quoting Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover for Attorney Gen. J. Howard McGrath,
supra note 13).
114. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. J. Howard McGrath for J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI 1
(Feb. 26, 1952), in FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 137.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. THEOHARIS, SPYING, supra note 107, at 107.
118. Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 68 (noting reported operations fell
from seventy-five in 1951 to sixty-three in 1952 and fifty-two in 1953). One internal FBI
memorandum privately estimated that trespassory bugging comprised about twenty-five percent
of total bugging operations. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 86, at 29.
119. Memorandum from Louis Nichols, Assistant Dir., FBI, for Clyde Tolson, Assoc. Dir., FBI
(Mar. 29, 1954), in FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 139.
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Hoover claimed that McGrath's successor, James McGranery, orally
blessed the continuation of trespassory bugging during national
security investigations. 120
This memorialization seems suspect. Other accounts indicate
the Justice Department rejected an FBI request to use trespassory
bugging only days after McGranery took over as Attorney General in
April 1952.121 Even assuming McGranery assented to trespassory
bugging, this was apparently only an extralegal understanding; the
FBI still lacked official legal backing from the Justice Department.
The equilibrium that emerged during the initial postwar years
persisted for decades: national security investigations employed
invasive investigative techniques, but the collected information
remained out of the courtroom. While trespassory techniques never
fully abated, 122 failed prosecutions, congressional inquiries, and
Justice Department warnings inspired Hoover to curb certain
practices and take precautions in others. Substantial legal uncertainty
remained during these years, however, and not until later would this
de facto equilibrium be adopted as a de jure rule.
B. The De Jure National Security Exception: 1954-1966
Upon assuming the presidency in 1953, Dwight Eisenhower
felt, in the words of his Attorney General Herbert Brownell, "a special
need to reassure the public that steps were being taken so that there
would be no recurrence of the notorious cases of transmission of
classified information to Soviet spies."123 Encouraged by Eisenhower's
focus, FBI officials started lobbying Justice Department officials for,
as one Hoover deputy put it, "some backing of the [Justice]
Department to utilize microphone surveillances where the intelligence
to be gained was a necessary adjunct to security matters and
important investigations, in instances when prosecution is not
contemplated."124
120. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI, for the Director's File (June 9, 1952), in
FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 138-39.
121. WISE, supra note 73, at 152 ("On April 10, 1952, the [Justice] Department responded to
another Hoover inquiry by warning the FBI chief that installing a mike in a hotel room would
invade the privacy 'of the guest and his guests.' ").
122. To be fair, the FBI was also never instructed to cease these activities; the Justice
Department's response during these early years was a refusal to authorize such practices, not a
direct order to quit their employment. THEOHARIS, SPYING, supra note 107, at 107 (noting
McGrath "did not explicitly prohibit" warrantless wiretapping).
123. HERBERT BROWNELL & JOHN BURKE, ADVISING IKE 247 (Univ. Press of Kansas 1993).
124. Memorandum from Louis Nichols for Clyde Tolson, supra note 119, at 139; see also
WISE, supra note 73, at 151-53 (describing lobbying effort).
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The ensuing discussion between the FBI and Justice
Department led to the federal government's first formal embrace of a
national security exception to the Fourth Amendment. This
acceptance continued under successive administrations. The national
security exception became a legal keystone for subsequent security
investigations. But while a constitutional theory emerged that could
justify what was previously considered extralegal conduct, the
exception operated within the same circumscriptions that limited
earlier FBI operations. Specifically, warrantless investigative
techniques, even in national security matters, remained limited to
purely intelligence operations, meaning that collected information
could only be used in nonprosecutorial manners.
1. Brownell: A Formal, but Limited, National Security Exception
Eisenhower officials initially adhered to McGrath's assessment
that warrantless trespassory bugging, even during national security
investigations, was unconstitutional. 125 In March 1954, Assistant
Attorney General Warren Olney expressed "doubt[] that the Attorney
General could authorize a microphone where trespass is clearly
indicated."126 Similarly, Deputy Attorney General William Rogers told
FBI officials in that same month that he "did not think much ... of
the idea of having the Attorney General clear microphone
surveillances."127
Nevertheless, persistent FBI officials ultimately found an ally
in Attorney General Brownell. In early 1954, Hoover wrote Brownell
ostensibly for the Attorney General's guidance on Irvine v. California,
in which the Supreme Court squarely held that the warrantless
installation of a microphone inside a suspect's house violated the
Fourth Amendment.128
In May 1954, Brownell responded by memorandum.
Recognizing that "in some instances the use of microphone
surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities of
espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons,"
Brownell believed that "the national interest requires that microphone
125. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 86, at 28 (describing 1953 meeting with
Justice Department lawyers who told FBI that "it was apparent that the Attorney General, as
chief law enforcement officer, could not be placed in the position of authorizing outright
trespass").
126. Memorandum from Leland Boardman, Assistant Dir., FBI, for J. Edgar Hoover, Dir.,
FBI (Mar. 31, 1954), in FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 140.
127. Memorandum from Louis Nichols, Assistant Dir., FBI, for Clyde Tolson, Assoc. Dir., FBI
(Apr. 14, 1954), in FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 140.
128. 347 U.S. 128, 146 (1954).
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surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation."129
Though warning that microphone surveillance involving "a
trespass ... must necessarily be resolved according to the
circumstances of each case," Brownell blessed the FBI's use of
trespassory bugging in national security matters: "[T]he Department
should adopt that interpretation which will permit microphone
coverage by the FBI in a manner most conducive to our national
interest .... [C]onsiderations of internal security and the national
safety are paramount and, therefore, may compel the unrestricted use
of this technique in the national interest."o30
Moreover, Brownell's memorandum made clear that, rather
than acknowledging extralegal surveillance as a necessary evil, the
Attorney General intended to offer a constitutional justification for
trespassory bugging. Under circumstances in which such surveillance
was necessary to the national interest, Brownell reasoned, "The
installation [of a bug through trespass] is proper and is not prohibited
by the Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case . . . ."1a1 Since Irvine
clearly held that a police officer's use of a microphone violated the
Fourth Amendment absent special circumstances, the memorandum
implied that national security investigations operated under different
legal principles than ordinary criminal investigations. 13 2
The key to the legal theory outlined in Brownell's
memorandum was the distinction between evidence collection and
intelligence gathering. "The FBI has an intelligence function in
connection with internal security matters equally as important as the
duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts," the
memorandum opined. 33 The Brownell memorandum did not mark the
first time this distinction was asserted. When Hoover wrote then-
Attorney General McGrath in 1952 seeking authorization for
trespassory bugging, Hoover urged that such operations were "of an
intelligence nature only."134 Director Hoover conceded that "[t]he
129. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Herbert Brownell for J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI 1
(May 20, 1954) (copy on file with author).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 43, § 3:4 ("Because the Supreme Court had made clear that
a warrantless government trespass to install a microphone violated the Fourth Amendment,
Attorney General Brownell's authorization . . . seemed to represent an assertion that 'internal
security' allowed government agents to engage in conduct that otherwise would violate the
Fourth Amendment.").
133. Id.
134. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover for Attorney Gen. J. Howard McGrath, supra note
13. By contrast, when a microphone was installed without trespassing, Hoover stated, "the
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information obtained from [trespassory] microphones ... is not
admissible in evidence" but reasoned that if investigations remained
"purely intelligence" operations-in other words, for nonevidentiary
purposes-they would not run afoul of the constitutional difficulties
the Bureau had previously encountered.135 McGrath rejected this
constitutional distinction, but Brownell accepted and incorporated it
into his own memorandum. (The parallels between Hoover's 1952
memorandum and Brownell's 1954 memorandum are unsurprising
since, as a later FBI account shows, the Bureau drafted the latter.)136
The Brownell memorandum, therefore, deemed trespassory
bugging constitutionally permissible so long as it remained for purely
intelligence matters. Brownell acknowledged the risk that trespasses
posed to "the admissibility in court of the evidence thus obtained."137
The FBI likewise understood this distinction between intelligence
gathering and evidence collection. An internal Bureau analysis of the
Brownell memorandum recognized that the authorization therein was
not applicable "relative to criminal cases" and concluded that the FBI
should continue to avoid trespassory microphones "particularly in
cases which might go to prosecution."138 In other words, the Bureau
recognized that the Brownell memorandum authorized only the
"purely intelligence" investigations that Hoover described to Attorney
General McGrath in 1952. Despite this circumscription, Brownell's
memorandum had notable operational significance: reported bugging
operations doubled in the two years subsequent to the memorandum's
issuance. 139
More than any other single point in the nation's legal history,
Brownell's memorandum marks the origin of the national security
exception to the Fourth Amendment. While the FBI already conducted
warrantless bugging prior to the 1954 directive, these operations
occurred in uncertain legal waters and were sometimes assumed to be
outright extralegal affairs. Another two decades would pass before the
information obtained . . . is treated as evidence and therefore is not regarded as purely
intelligence information." Id.
135. Id.
136. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 86, at 37-40; see also THEOHARIS, SPYING,
supra note 107, at 108 (noting Hoover enclosed a draft memorandum to Brownell in his 1954
letter).
137. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Herbert Brownell for J. Edgar Hoover, supra note
129, at 1.
138. Memorandum from A.H. Belmont, Assistant Dir., FBI, for L.V. Boardman, Assistant
Dir., FBI (May 8, 1954), quoted in FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 86, at 38-39
(discussing draft memorandum).
139. Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 68 (reporting rise in reported
bugging from 52 cases in 1953 to 99 in 1954 and 102 in 1955).
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judiciary formally adopted the exception, but the Attorney General's
blessing brought bugging back within the fold of legitimacy. At the
same time, the Justice Department's authorization rested on a
distinction between evidentiary and nonevidentiary searches that
limited the FBI's use of trespassory bugging and, later, other
warrantless investigative techniques, to pure intelligence gathering.
2. Adherence to the Pure Intelligence Rule
Brownell's memorandum served as precedent for succeeding
administrations to authorize warrantless trespassory bugging in
national security matters, and subsequent attorneys general expressly
authorized warrantless security searches if the Bureau limited their
use to intelligence purposes. For example, Brownell's successor,
William Rogers, authorized the use of trespassory bugs in national
security investigations, despite earlier hesitations he had expressed as
Brownell's deputy.140 According to Justice Department memoranda,
however, Rogers restricted his authorization to searches "for purposes
of intelligence and not for the purpose of prosecution," the same caveat
imposed by the Brownell memorandum.14'
After John F. Kennedy's election in 1961, the FBI continued to
use trespassory bugging circumscribed by the pure intelligence rule.
The Bureau informed the Kennedy Administration that such
operations were authorized only in security investigations done for
intelligence purposes. In May 1961, Hoover wrote to then-Deputy
Attorney General Byron White to set forth "[the Bureau's] views on
the use of microphone surveillances in FBI cases":142 "Our policy on
the use of microphone surveillances is based upon a memorandum
from former Attorney General Herbert Brownell dated May 20, 1954,
in which he approved the use of microphone surveillance with or
without trespass," Hoover explained.143 "In light of this policy, in the
internal security field, we are utilizing microphone surveillances on a
restricted basis even though trespass is necessary to assist in
uncovering the activities of Soviet intelligence agents and Communist
140. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing Rogers's earlier hesitancy).
Despite later FBI allegations, Rogers also claimed to have never authorized trespassory bugging
"outside of the internal security area." Athan G. Theoharis, The Attorney General and the FBI: A
Problem of Oversight, USA TODAY, May 1979, at 62.
141. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach for J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI
(May 31, 1966), in FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 161.
142. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI, for Byron White, Deputy Att'y Gen.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 4, 1961), reprinted in VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 506
(Scribner 1971).
143. Id.
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Party leaders."144 Hoover emphasized, however, that trespassory
bugging "is treated ... not from the standpoint of evidentiary value
but for intelligence purposes."145 After being apprised of this limited
use, the Justice Department permitted bugging operations to continue
under those same restrictions. 146
In contrast, the Johnson Administration offered a more critical
eye toward the FBI's microphone surveillance. By the time of
Johnson's presidency, federal use of trespassory surveillance had
seemingly expanded to nonsecurity matters, such as tax evasion and
organized crime. Shortly after taking office, Johnson moved to
discontinue the growth of this practice. 147 "Utilization of mechanical or
electronic devices to overhear nontelephone conversations . .. raises
substantial and unresolved questions of Constitutional
interpretation," the President wrote to members of his Administration
in 1965.148 Following the President's lead, Johnson's first Attorney
General, Nicholas Katzenbach, instructed Hoover to halt warrantless
trespassory bugging in organized crime and other nonsecurity
investigations. 149 To enforce this restriction, Katzenbach also required
the FBI to obtain the Attorney General's authorization before
conducting such surveillance.150 But while Katzenbach curbed what
the public increasingly viewed as FBI abuses in bugging, he exempted
national security investigations from his prohibitions. When Hoover
informed the Attorney General that the FBI had "discontinued
completely the use of microphones,"'51 Katzenbach responded that he
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. JAMES W. HILTY, ROBERT KENNEDY: BROTHER PROTECTOR 235 (Temple Univ. Press
1997) (describing bugging conversations between FBI and Attorney General Robert Kennedy);
FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 132 ("In August 1961 Hoover
was able to secure Kennedy's blind approval of future FBI bugging."); see also Levi, Church
Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 68-69 (reporting FBI records indicate 441 warrantless
bugging operations took place between 1961 and 1965).
147. No Federal Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1965 ("Apparently Mr. Johnson made known
his opposition to wiretapping shortly after he took office in 1963.").
148. Memorandum from President Lyndon B. Johnson for Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies (June 30, 1965) (copy on file with author).
149. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach for J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI
(Jan. 27, 1966), in FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 149.
150. THEOHARIS, SPYING, supra note 107, at 112-14 (describing "first effective reviewing
process" of FBI bugging).
151. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI, for Attorney Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach
(Sept. 14, 1965), in FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 147.
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saw "no need to curtail any such activities in the national security
field."152
The Johnson Administration permitted bugging to continue in
security investigations but emphasized that the technique was only to
be used for nonevidentiary purposes in line with what had become the
de jure pure intelligence rule. Katzenbach instructed Hoover that the
use of "microphones involving trespass" should be "confined to the
gathering of intelligence in national security matters," given "the
inadmissibility of any evidence obtained in court cases."15 3
"[I]nformation or leads obtained by this means can not [sic] be used for
purposes of prosecution," Katzenbach reiterated in a later
memorandum. 154 Similarly, a 1966 memorandum from Katzenbach's
successor, Ramsey Clark, to all U.S. Attorneys emphasized that
"[i]ntelligence data so collected [by national security bugging] will not
be available for investigative or litigative purposes."155
As before, Justice Department officials kept the intelligence
collected from bugging out of the courtroom, even at the cost of
criminal convictions. In 1963, for example, federal agents arrested
Aleksandr Sokolov, living under the assumed name Robert Baitch,
and his wife. The two were indicted for attempting to transmit
sensitive military information to the Soviet Union. 15 6 On the eve of
trial in fall 1964, the prosecuting U.S. Attorney, Joseph Hoey,
repeatedly denied in open court that the government had used any
warrantless investigative techniques during the Baltch investigation.
In reality, the FBI had bugged the suspects' apartment and opened
their mail. 17
As the jury trial opened, Katzenbach (then serving as Acting
Attorney General) was apprised of the investigative techniques the
FBI had used. Outraged, Katzenbach immediately directed Hoey to
correct his statement and, it appears, ordered prosecutors not to use
evidence derived from the bugging and mail-opening operations.15 8 On
152. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach for J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., FBI
(Sept. 27, 1965), quoted in SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 287 (1976), available
at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94thl94755_III.pdf.
153. Id.
154. Memorandum from Nicholas Katzenbach for J. Edgar Hoover, supra note 141.
155. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Ramsey Clark for all United States Attorneys (Nov.
3, 1966) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 288.
156. James P. McCaffrey, Russian Spy Suspect Identified, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1963, at 12.
157. THEOHARIS, SPYING, supra note 107, at 112.
158. Id.; see also THEOHARIS, SPYING, supra note 107, at 112 (describing BaItch trial and
attributing dismissal to bugging issue); RICHARD C.S. TRAHAIR & ROBERT L. MILLER,
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the afternoon of the first day of trial, Hoey announced to the court
that he had "been instructed by the Attorney General that, in the
interests of national security, he would not offer any evidence relating
to [the major espionage counts] of the indictment."159 This about-face,
which newspapers covered on their front pages, prompted the
government to dismiss the charges against the Sokolovs, who were
subsequently deported to the Soviet Union.o60
As the Cold War progressed, the continuing dialogue between
the FBI and Justice Department placed the nation's domestic
counterintelligence programs on more stable legal footing. By the
1960s, both agents and government lawyers felt comfortable with the
principle of the national security exception to the Fourth Amendment
but acknowledged the exception's limited nature by referring to
security investigations as intelligence-rather than evidentiary-
searches.
C. The Judicial National Security Exception: 1966-1978
Beginning in the 1960s, debates about the Fourth
Amendment's national security exception moved from the executive
branch into the halls of Congress and the chambers of the judiciary;
both branches tentatively embraced the exception. Government
officials began to apply the rule to a growing number of techniques
and security investigations. At the same time, the exception remained
within the pure intelligence paradigm.
1. Black and Schipani: Briefing the Limited Security Exception
For two decades after World War II, executive discussions
about the legal framework for national security investigations
remained out of the judicial and public eye. In the 1960s, however,
events forced the executive branch to disclose its legal justifications.
In 1964, the Justice Department successfully convicted lobbyist Fred
Black of income tax evasion but learned during Black's appeal that the
FBI had bugged his Las Vegas hotel room without a warrant.161 After
the Justice Department disclosed its error, the Supreme Court-likely
influenced by congressional investigations of similar bugging
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COLD WAR ESPIONAGE, SPIES, AND SECRET OPERATIONS 86 (Enigma Books
2012) (noting the Baltches were released because "[elvidence from eavesdropping was not
admissible in court").
159. David Anderson, U.S. Drops Trial of 2 in Spy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1964, at 1, 10.
160. Id.
161. FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 13, at 154.
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abuseS162-- ordered the government to submit a supplemental brief
more fully explicating its use of microphone surveillance. 63 The brief
would become the executive's first public disclosure of its surveillance
policies.164
On July 13, 1966, Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall filed
the government's supplemental memorandum, which laid out the
scope of authorized microphone surveillance in national security
matters:
Under Departmental practice ... the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
was given authority to approve the installation of devices such as that in question for
intelligence (and not evidentiary) purposes when required in the interests of internal
security or national safety .... Present Departmental practice, adopted in July 1960 in
conformity with the policies declared by the President on June 30, 1965, for the entire
federal establishment, prohibits the use of such listening devices (as well as the
interception of telephone and other wire communications) in all instances other than
those involving the collection of intelligence affecting the national security. 1 6 5
Later that year, Solicitor General Marshall reiterated the
limited nature of the government's warrantless surveillance while
briefing another nonsecurity bugging case, Schipani v. United States:
Present governmental practice . . . prohibits such electronic surveillance [i.e.,
microphone surveillance] in all instances except those involving the collection of
intelligence with respect to matters affecting national security. Such intelligence data
will not be made available for prosecutorial purposes, and the specific authorization of
the Attorney General must be obtained in each instance when the national security
exception is sought to be invoked. 166
Though neither Black nor Schipani involved national security
matters, both government briefs emphasized that the Johnson
Administration had only allowed electronic surveillance for
intelligence purposes in national security cases. Emphasizing this self-
circumscription was clearly strategic, aimed to garner judicial support
162. The most high-profile congressional investigation, led by Senator Edward Long,
revealed various cases of government agents using warrantless wiretaps, particularly by the
Internal Revenue Service. National security investigations, however, were not the Committee's
focus. ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL 40-42 (Univ. of Illinois Press 1992).
163. U.S. Eavesdropping Policy May Be Divulged Today in Answers to Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 1966.
164. Id. (noting government "may acknowledge officially for the first time a practice that has
evolved over the last 30 years").
165. Supplemental Memorandum of the United States, Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26
(1966) (No. 1029), quoted in Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 69.
166. Supplemental Memorandum for the United States at 4, Schipani v. United States, 385
U.S. 372 (1966) (No. 504). Like Black, Schipani was convicted of income tax evasion. In October
1966, the FBI notified the Acting Attorney General that Schipani participated "in various
conversations electronically monitored on a number of occasions in 1961" and that the
microphone was installed "by means of a trespass." Id. at 2.
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for a national security exception to the Fourth Amendment.'67 The
briefs also show the degree to which the pure intelligence rule had
become the legal foundation for the use of warrantless investigative
techniques, and the government's disclosures were likely offered to
show that surveillance was circumscribed enough to protect civil
liberties.
The Supreme Court did not address the merits of the
government's implicit arguments about national security
investigations, instead remanding both Black and Schipani for
retrials. But the following year, the Court finally raised the possibility
of a national security exception during a series of decisions dealing
with another technique vital to national security investigations:
wiretapping.
2. Katz: A Judicial Nod to the Security Exception
Wiretapping, also known as telephone surveillance, involves
the interception of a message during its transmission by wire or radio
wave from one party to another. 168 Like bugging and physical
searches, wiretapping became frequently employed in national
security investigations; as noted above, Franklin Roosevelt authorized
wiretapping in security matters as early as 1940.169 But, while
wiretapping was prolific in security investigations, federal officials did
not rely on the Fourth Amendment's national security exception
because, unlike bugging, wiretapping rarely involves physical
trespass. Consequently, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme
Court held such surveillance to be outside the Fourth Amendment's
ambit and therefore constitutionally permissible.170
167. At the time, Katzenbach estimated that fewer than fifty national security buggings
were authorized at any time. Katzenbach Foresees Passage of Fair Housing Bill Eventually, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1966.
168. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 240 n.1 (1979) (describing wiretapping as
"confined to the interception of communication by telephone and telegraph and generally may be
performed from outside the premises to be monitored"). Like bugging, government agents have
long employed "tapping" during security investigations. Union officers tapped telegraph wires
during the Civil War. SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 23 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1959).
In the lead-up to World War I, the Secret Service installed wiretaps to surveil German and
Austro-Hungarian delegations. Banks & Bowman, supra note 21, at 20.
169. Memorandum from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Attorney Gen. Robert Jackson,
supra note 56, at 2; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting reliance on Roosevelt
memorandum).
170. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) ("[Olne who installs in his house a telephone instrument with
connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and ... the wires beyond his
house, and messages while passing over them, are not within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.").
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Yet, even without constitutional restraints, Congress
statutorily imposed the pure intelligence rule on wiretapping. Section
605 of the 1934 Communications Act barred persons from
"intercept[ing] any communication and divulg[ing] or publish[ing] the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person."17' In Nardone v. United
States, the Supreme Court read section 605's "interception and
divulgence" ban to bar government agents from introducing
wiretapped communications or their "fruits" at trial.172 Since the
Communication Act's language only prohibited the combination of
intercepting and divulging evidence, however, the Justice Department
interpreted section 605 to permit wiretapping as long as prosecutors
did not introduce the information at trial. 73 The result was a pure
intelligence rule parallel to the Fourth Amendment's regulation of
early security investigations.174
Like the constitutionally imposed pure intelligence rule, section
605's evidentiary ban spoiled some espionage trials. In 1949, for
example, the Second Circuit vacated the conviction of Judith Coplon, a
Justice Department employee caught spying for the Soviet Union, on
the grounds that the FBI violated section 605 by wiretapping
Coplon.175 Executive officials also admitted other cases remained in
171. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064. Congress's intent
with respect to section 605 is- somewhat unclear. To Authorize Wire Tapping: Hearings on H.R.
2266 and H.R. 3099 Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong.
238-39 (1941) (statement of Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice) (claiming section's purpose was to "protect persons ... against acts such as the divulging
of information on the part of switchboard operators or telegraph operators"); see also WALTER F.
MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL 133 (Random House 1965) (describing section's unclear
origins).
172. Nardone v. United States (Nardone 1), 302 U.S. 379, 381 (1937); Nardone v. United
States (Nardone 1l), 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). While executive officials condemned the Nardone
decisions, many members of Congress embraced the evidentiary bar. Wiretapping for National
Security: Hearings on H.R. 408 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d
Cong. 29 (1953) (statements of Reps. Willis and Rogers) (describing, approvingly, that section
605's wiretapping bar was "common-law rule now").
173. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 8, at 1035-46 (describing early interpretations of
Section 605).
174. "I do not think ... the Communications Act, as a matter of law, prevents the executive
branches of the government from tapping wires. It does, without any question, prevent the use of
the evidence thus obtained," Attorney General Francis Biddle testified. Authorizing Wire
Tapping in the Prosecution of the War: Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Part II, 77th Cong. 2 (1942).
175. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 640 (2d Cir. 1950). The D.C. Circuit vacated a
second conviction on similar grounds. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
(concluding district court "erred in not affording a hearing as to the appellant's allegations that
the government listened through a wiretapping device to her telephone conversations with her
attorney"); see also MARCIA MITCHELL & THOMAS MITCHELL, THE SPY WHO SEDUCED AMERICA
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"cold storage"-that is, unprosecuted-due to section 605.176 Despite
these prosecutorial problems, section 605, as interpreted by the
Justice Department, still allowed the FBI to conduct pure intelligence
wiretapping. Records show that the FBI employed thousands of
wiretaps between 1945 and 1966, many of which were aimed at
foreign threats. 177
When the Supreme Court prepared to overrule Olmstead and
develop a constitutional framework for wiretapping, at least one
Justice, Byron White, recognized the possible implications for national
security investigations. Before Justice White ascended to the Supreme
Court, he served in the Kennedy Justice Department, where he gained
familiarity with electronic surveillance and became an advocate for
such techniques.178 White continued his advocacy for national security
surveillance from the bench. In the 1967 case Berger v. New York, for
example, the Court outlined the constitutional parameters for search
warrants authorizing electronic surveillance.1 7 9 White, writing in
dissent, protested that the majority's rule made no room for Congress
to create a "national security exemption." 180 "[I]f electronic
surveillance ... must be circumscribed in the manner the Court now
suggests, how can surreptitious electronic surveillance of a suspected
Communist or a suspected saboteur escape the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment?" he asked.181 White offered that there "are some
purposes and uses of electronic surveillance which do not involve
(Invisible Cities Press 2002) (recounting the Coplon affair); Luther A. Huston, Judith Coplon
Wins a New Trial but Legal Tangle May Prevent It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1952, at 1, 9; Court
Reverses Conviction of Judith Coplon, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1950, at 1. The FBI also bugged
Coplon, though the judiciary never reached that issue. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra
note 86, at 14 (noting FBI notified Justice Department that "a microphone was utilized in the
espionage case involving Judith Coplon").
176. Spy Trials Hinged on Wiretap Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1953, at 26; see also William P.
Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 793 (1954) ("[Under section 605,] law
enforcement officials possessed of intercepted information vital to the security of the nation may
not use such information in bringing spies and saboteurs to justice in our federal courts."); Letter
from Attorney Gen. J. Howard McGrath to Emanuel Celler, U.S. Representative, N.Y. (Feb. 2,
1951), reprinted in Wiretapping for National Security, supra note 172 (noting section 605's effect
on "number" of security cases but declining "to identify any of them [cases] by name").
177. Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 68-69 (reporting 5,807 wiretaps
between 1945 and 1966).
178. DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 308, 497 (Free Press
1998); see also Morton Mintz, Kennedy Hints FBI Wiretapping, WASH. POST, June 27, 1966
(quoting Justice Department official as saying that "'Whizzer' White knew a lot about this
[electronic surveillance] himself when he was working for Bobby [Kennedy]").
179. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50-64 (1967).
180. Id. at 115 (White, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 116.
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violations of the Fourth Amendment by the Executive Branch," the
first of which was national security investigations. 182
Though White persuaded no colleagues in Berger, he was more
successful later that year when the Court finally overruled Olmstead
in Katz v. United States.8s Katz held that nontrespassory electronic
surveillance (i.e., wiretapping and nontrespassory bugging)
constituted a Fourth Amendment "search" and ordinarily required ex
ante judicial approval.'84 Katz had nothing to do with national
security-the case involved a bookie-and the briefs made no mention
of foreign affairs or other security considerations.1 85 Nevertheless, in
footnote twenty-three, the Katz Court expressly reserved the question
of "[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation
involving the national security."86
From the Justices' papers, one can trace footnote twenty-three
to Justice White. Early drafts of the Katz opinion circulated by Justice
Potter Stewart did not contain the national security caveat.'87 After
Stewart submitted his draft, however, White circulated an opinion
dated November 28, 1967 in which he dissented in part. "I would not
erect an impenetrable constitutional barrier to eavesdropping or
wiretapping performed without a judicial warrant" in national
security cases, White's draft opined.188 Two days after White sent out
his opinion, Justice Abe Fortas wrote to Stewart, suggesting Stewart
"insert something reserving national security cases in which maybe
the Constitution would permit electronic espionage on authorization
by the President or the Attorney General. This is Byron White's idea,
182. Id.
183. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
184. Katz itself did not involve a wiretap, but rather a nontrespassory microphone taped on
top of a public telephone booth. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 849 (2004).
185. Funk, supra note 15, at 1107 n.39 ("[here is no mention of national security in the
government's brief.").
186. 389 U.S. at 358 n.23.
187. See Papers of Justice William 0. Douglas (on file with the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 1414) (containing Stewart's initial draft).
188. Id. (containing draft White dissent). Discussion amongst the Justices of national
security matters may have preceded the draft. On an undated note attached to the first draft of
his Katz concurrence, William Douglas's clerk wrote that "Justice White, rather than Justice
Black, injects the national security issue into the Katz case .... You asked me to write a brief
response to the national security point if Justice Black raised it, so I assume this stands for
Justice White, too. The following is my proposal." Id. (containing note). Multiple Justices,
therefore, appear to have recognized Katz's security implications before White's circulated
dissent.
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and I think it would be well to adopt the suggestion."189 Later that
day, Stewart circulated a new draft with footnote twenty-three as it
appears in the published opinion.o90 White withdrew his partial
dissent.9 1
Katz's footnote twenty-three "proved to have lasting historical
significance."192 Though Katz was supposedly agnostic on the issue,
the executive branch interpreted footnote twenty-three as a judicial
blessing of the national security exception. The FBI, which had
officially halted the use of trespassory microphone surveillance in
1967 in light of the technique's legal uncertainty, resumed bugging in
1968 after Katz was decided.193 Government lawyers relied on Katz to
defend the use of warrantless investigative techniques in national
security matters,194 and lower courts embraced the exception. In 1970,
the Fifth Circuit found warrantless wiretapping to be lawful "for the
purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information"-the first court
to so hold.195
189. Id. (containing copy of Fortas note).
190. Id. (containing subsequent Stewart draft).
191. White concurred in Katz but issued an opinion proposing that, in national security
cases, the warrant requirement be excused as long as the "President of the United States or his
chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security
and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable." Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (White, J.,
concurring). "[Warrantless w]iretapping to protect the security of the Nation has been authorized
by successive Presidents," White argued. Id. at 363.
192. Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The Background and First
Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 800 (1989).
193. Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 69 (noting no reported bugging
operations in 1967). The FBI's newfound restraint was also attributable to the Johnson
Administration's requirement that the FBI obtain the Attorney General's authorization before
conducting such surveillance. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing
Katzenbach's instructions to Hoover to halt warrantless trespassory bugging).
194. After Katz, the Justice Department thought the exception excused all warrantless
Fourth Amendment techniques, including bugging, wiretapping, and black bag jobs. In 1975, the
Justice Department submitted a letter to the D.C. Circuit claiming the exception covered both
physical searches and electronic surveillance, reasoning that "[o]ne form of search is no less
serious than another." Letter from John C. Keeney, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Hugh E. Kline, Clerk of the Court, D.C. Cir. (May 9, 1975), quoted in SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, SUPPLEMENTARY
DETAILED STAFF REPORTS OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK
III, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 369-70 (1976), available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/
pdfs94th/94755_III.pdf. This view ultimately prevailed. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh
Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912-17 (4th Cir. 1980) (applying exception to physical search); United
States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 778, 792-94 (N.D. fl. 2006) (same). But see United States v.
Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 33-34 (D.D.C. 1974) (distinguishing wiretapping from break-ins,
which went to "core of the Fourth Amendment).
195. United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 1970); see also United States v.
Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 508 (D.D.C. 1971) (finding "defendant's conversations intercepted
during . . . electronic surveillance, conducted for the purpose of gaining foreign intelligence
information, was not intercepted illegally').
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Even after Katz, however, the government continued its
adherence to the pure intelligence rule. In 1968, for example, the
government relied on Katz to defend the warrantless wiretapping of
two suspected Soviet spies, John Butenko and Igor Ivanov.196 The
Justice Department made a point of reiterating to the Supreme Court
that "the government has not claimed that evidence obtained by
electronic eavesdropping in the course of a national security
investigation is admissible in a criminal trial."197 While Katz gave
credence to the national security exception, the exception remained
firmly within the pure intelligence paradigm.198
3. Keith: Maintaining a Limited Security Exception
In 1972, the Supreme Court revisited Katz's reference to a
national security exception in United States v. United States District
Court, commonly called the Keith case. 199 The case involved the
prosecution of three members of the White Panther Party for the
bombing of a CIA office. 200 During pretrial discovery, the government
conceded that agents overheard one defendant's conversations on a
warrantless wiretap.201 The government refused, however, to turn over
transcripts of the conversations, arguing that the taps were legal and
the conversations were irrelevant to the charges at hand. In defense of
196. Brief for the United States at 8-9, Ivanov v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Nos.
11, 197), 1968 WL 129379, at *7. The government supposedly backed away from that position at
oral arguments. Justice Stewart later recounted that "[iun oral argument of the Butenko and
Ivanov cases, the Solicitor General, mystifyingly, sought to concede that the surveillances there
were in fact unconstitutional, although he was repeatedly invited to argue that they were not."
Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310, 313 n.1 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Solicitor
General possibly did not mean that the wiretapping itself was unconstitutional, but rather the
prosecutorial use of collected information was impermissible. That position aligns with both the
government's briefs and historical practice.
197. Brief for the United States at 8-9, Ivanov, 394 U.S. 165 (Nos. 11, 197).
198. See Funk, supra note 15, at 1107-08 (arguing "because the government itself had only
represented that it only used such surveillances for intelligence purposes and not for evidentiary
purposes," Katz only intended to permit security investigations for intelligence purposes).
199. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
200. Id.; see also Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United States v. United States District
Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 287 (Christopher H.
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2008). Formed to support the Black Panther Party, the
White Panthers sought "Cultural Revolution ... us[ing] every tool, every energy and any media
we can get our collective hands on." Id. at 292 (quoting manifesto).
201. According to Justice Powell's notes, the conversations were between the defendant and
Black Panther members. Papers of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (on file with Washington and Lee
University School of Law), available at http://law.wlu.eduldeptimages/powell%20archives/70-
153_U.S.%20v.%20U.S.%2ODistrict%20Court,%201972March-April.pdf.
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the wiretap's legality, the government claimed that the national
security exception excused the search. 202
Keith represents the first effort by an administration to expand
the national security exception beyond the pure intelligence paradigm.
In the government's reply brief, the Nixon Administration argued that
"in the course of such [warrantless national security] surveillance
evidence may be obtained that indicates the commission of a crime. In
such an event the government contends that it would be fully
warranted in using the evidence thus obtained in prosecuting the
crime thus disclosed." 203 While Katz had only tentatively broached the
national security exception, the Nixon Administration sought to
dramatically expand its scope by breaking from thirty years of
practice-practice that had only just recently been disclosed to the
judiciary and was defended by relying on the pure intelligence rule.
The government's arguments in Keith, however, found no
supporters in the Supreme Court-unsurprisingly, since Nixon's own
Solicitor General, Erwin Griswold, refused to argue the case based on
his belief that the government's conduct had been unconstitutional. 204
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, held that the government's
"domestic security surveillances" program into "internal security
matters" and "domestic organizations" did not qualify for the national
security exception. 205 At the same time, the Keith decision largely
affirmed a more restrained version of the national security exception.
The Court made clear that the decision did not apply to the
warrantless surveillance of threats that "involve[] ... foreign powers
or their agents."206 It also noted a growing "view that warrantless
surveillance, though impermissible in domestic security cases, may be
202. Brief for the United States at 17, Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (No. 70-153).
203. Reply Brief for the United States at 2-3, Keith, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (No. 70-153). In a
later filing in Ivanov v. United States, the Nixon Administration reiterated this claim-in direct
contradiction to the government's statement during Ivanov's first appeal. Compare
Memorandum for the United States at 13, Ivanov v. United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (No. 73-
1648) ("If an electronic surveillance which was authorized for purposes of foreign intelligence
gathering incidentally turns up evidence of criminal activity, such evidence may be introduced in
a criminal trial because the surveillance itself was constitutional."), with Brief for the United
States at 8-9, Ivanov, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (Nos. 11, 197), 1968 WL 129379, at *8-9 (conceding
"evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping in the course of a national security investigation
is [not] admissible in a criminal trial").
204. See Morrison, supra note 200, at 305; see also LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE
34-35, 290 n.11 (Knopf 1988) (noting Griswold "believed the Nixon Administration was seeking
more authority for the Executive Branch than the laws in question allowed" and "that he would
diminish his credibility with the Justices if he made the claims that the Executive Branch
wanted him to press").
205. Keith, 407 U.S. at 299-300, 318.
206. Id. at 321-22.
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constitutional where foreign powers are involved."207 After Keith,
lower courts held that national security constituted a "recognized
exception" to the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. 208 These cases
allowed warrantless surveillance solely "for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence," but none went beyond the pure intelligence
rule.209
Based on the caveats in Keith and Katz, the Nixon
Administration continued to authorize warrantless surveillance of
foreign threats. After Keith, Attorney General Elliot Richardson
announced he would approve applications for warrantless electronic
surveillance if he was "convinced that it is necessary (1) to protect the
nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a
foreign power; (2) to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed
essential to the security of the United States; or (3) to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities."210 The
Nixon Administration, however, did not challenge the pure
intelligence rule further but instead operated within the paradigm.
During Nixon's tenure as President, federal prosecutors never offered
any information collected from warrantless investigative techniques in
a criminal trial.211 The pure intelligence rule persisted as the
governing standard.
At the same time, the national security exception found greater
support in the judiciary. Because the pure intelligence rule ensured
that courts never admitted warrantlessly obtained evidence against
defendants, the initial judicial debates over the national security
207. Id. at 322 n.20 (citing United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 425-26 (C.D. Cal. 1971)).
208. United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); see also United States v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (holding warrantless search "conducted and
maintained solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information" was
constitutional); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that
"President may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence"). In 1975, a plurality of the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, challenged the
notion of a national security exception. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(en banc) (plurality opinion) ("[A]bsent exigent circumstances, no wiretapping in the area of
foreign affairs should be exempt from prior judicial scrutiny, irrespective of the justification for
the surveillance or the importance of the information sought."). That position, however, failed to
persuade. Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[W]e cannot accept appellants'
position that [Zweibon], or any other decision, authoritatively eliminated the foreign agent
exception.").
209. Butenko, 494 F.2d at 605.
210. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Sept. 12, 1973), reproduced in 14 CRIM. L. REP.
2042, 2042 (1973).
211. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at 92 (1978) (noting government did not "use evidence
obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance" in security prosecutions from 1968 through
1978).
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exception arose within discovery disputes. The Supreme Court's 1969
decision in Alderman v. United States obligated the government to
disclose information obtained from illegal searches or surveillance
without regard to its relevancy to the case at hand. 212 For national
security investigations, had courts deemed warrantless bugging and
wiretapping illegal, Alderman would have required the government to
disclose the contents of its security operations. The U.S. intelligence
community believed such disclosures would jeopardize future
operations. Relying on Katz and Keith, government lawyers
successfully limited Alderman's application in security cases by
arguing that warrantless bugs and wiretaps were permissible under
the Fourth Amendment, thereby avoiding potentially compromising
discovery obligations. None of these cases, however, questioned the
pure intelligence rule.213
4. Levi: A Theory of Pure Intelligence
After Nixon's resignation, the Ford Administration also
adhered to the pure intelligence paradigm. In 1976, the FBI
approached Ford's Attorney General, Edward Levi, after identifying
Truong Dinh Hung as a Vietnamese spy working in the United
States.214 Truong employed a courier to transport classified
information to a Vietnamese official in Paris, 215 and the courier, an
FBI informant, notified the Bureau. Eager to identify Truong's source
inside the U.S. government, the FBI sought authority to open the
couriered packages. Levi, however, rejected the FBI's request.
Operating under the pure intelligence paradigm, Levi believed any
warrantless search of a package would jeopardize future prosecutions
of Truong.216 Truong's first packages went unsearched. (The Carter
Administration later reversed this directive and ordered searches of
subsequent Truong packages.) 217
212. 394 U.S. 165, 181 (1969).
213. See United States v. Humphrey, 456 F. Supp. 51, 57 (E.D. Va. 1978) ("The issue before
the Court in [United States v.] Brown was not whether the conversations overheard through the
exercise of this power could be admitted into evidence but whether the interception was illegal,
thus necessitating their disclosure under the rule of Alderman."); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. I, at
92 n.49 (noting early cases did not involve prosecutorial use of wiretapping).
214. See GRIFFIN B. BELL, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 108-09 (William Morrow and Company,
Inc. 1982) (recounting request to Levi).
215. Scott J. Glick, FISA's Significant Purpose Requirement and the Government's Ability to
Protect National Security, 1 HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 87, 102-03 (2010).
216. BELL, supra note 213, at 109 (summarizing Truong episode). The FBI refused to get a
criminal warrant because it feared the notice requirement would jeopardize future operations.
Id.
217. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
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Levi also publicly offered a robust defense of the national
security exception as tempered by the pure intelligence rule. In 1975,
the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (commonly called
the "Church Committee") called Levi as a witness "to discuss the
relationship between electronic surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment." 218 In his testimony, the Attorney General surveyed the
executive branch's use of electronic surveillance. "As I read the
history," Levi offered, "the policy of the Department of Justice has
been that electronic surveillance could be employed without a warrant
in certain circumstances," specifically those involving the
investigations of foreign threats.219 Levi also emphasized the executive
branch's adherence to the pure intelligence rule, quoting the
government's supplemental memorandum in Black, as well as other
cases in which the government had "emphasiz[ed] that the data [from
trespassory surveillance] would not be made available for
prosecutorial purposes."220
Building on this background, Levi explored the reasons for not
using data from warrantless security investigations in subsequent
prosecutions. First, Levi noted that such a rule guarded against the
pretextual use of security investigations. "Exclusion of evidence from
criminal trials may help assure that searches undertaken for
ostensibly benign motives are not used as blinds for attempts to find
criminal evidence, while permitting searches that are genuinely
benign to continue," he explained.221 Levi's mention of pretext was
particularly poignant to his audience: during its tenure, the Church
Committee publicly documented various government abuses done in
the name of national security, including the warrantless bugging of
Martin Luther King, Jr.222 The Attorney General's statement conceded
that if left untempered the national security exception was susceptible
to abuse.
Levi's second argument assumed that exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment needed to be tailored to minimize intrusiveness. In this
vein, Levi concluded that any search that might allow the government
to obtain admissible evidence was, by its very nature, more intrusive
than a government search that could not:
218. Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 66.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 68-69 (discussing Black and Schipani briefs).
221. Id. at 78.
222. CHURCH COMMITTEE BOOK III, supra note 70, at 81-83 (detailing King wiretapping).
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The effect of a Government intrusion on individual security is a function . .. of
disclosure and of the use to which its product is put. Its effects are perhaps greatest
when it is employed or can be employed to impose criminal sanctions or to deter, by
disclosure, the exercise of individual freedoms. In short, the use of the product seized
bears upon the reasonableness of the search.223
Levi herein suggested that even if the government did not originally
intend, or even foresee, a search being useful for prosecution, a
prophylactic rule barring prosecutorial uses reduced a search's
intrusiveness as it was being conducted. Thus, the pure intelligence
rule helped satisfy the need to tailor intrusive investigations. 224
Lastly, Levi offered a pragmatic defense of the pure
intelligence rule. "Until very recently-in fact, until the Court's 1971
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotic Agents-the only
sanction against an illegal search was that its fruits were inadmissible
at any criminal trial of the person whose interest was invaded," he
noted.225 "In practical effect, a search could only be 'unreasonable' as a
matter of law if an attempt was made to use its fruits for
prosecution .... So long as the Government did not attempt such use,
the search could continue and the Government's interests, other than
enforcing criminal laws, could be satisfied."226 The self-restraint of the
pure intelligence rule therefore ensured the reasonableness of
warrantless surveillance from a historical perspective. "It may be said
that this confuses rights and remedies; searches could be
unreasonable even though no sanction followed. But I am not clear
that this is theoretically so, and realistically it was not so," Levi
concluded. 227
Levi's testimony offers a comprehensive defense of the national
security exception as conducted within the pure intelligence paradigm.
Warrantless intelligence searches, according to the Attorney General,
were permissible under a Fourth Amendment primarily geared toward
regulating law enforcement. Adherence to the pure intelligence rule
guarded against pretextual abuse of the exception and tailored
223. Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 78 (emphasis added).
224. At the time, Levi's tailoring emphasis had particular importance in light of Terry v.
Ohio, which stated searches needed to be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify
[their] initiation." 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968). Some courts initially read Terry "as imposing a least
intrusive alternative requirement upon all investigative detentions not justified under the
traditional probable cause standard." Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance:
Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1173, 1216 (1988). The Supreme Court, however, subsequently "refused to declare that only the
least intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." City of
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 78.
226. Id. at 101.
227. Id.
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security investigations to ensure constitutional reasonableness.
Though he was not the first to explain the legal theory behind early
national security investigations, Levi offered the most cogent
argument to defend three decades of investigatory practices geared
towards foreign threats.
D. Conclusion: Early Security Investigations and Pure Intelligence
Whether opinio juris genuinely guided the practice described
here-three decades of significant but circumscribed intelligence
gathering using invasive investigative techniques-is worth
pondering. In some cases, the government's investigatory conduct
preceded its legal theory. The FBI in particular was sometimes guilty
of a shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later attitude, failing to seek clear
judicial guidance until years after the fact.2 2 8 Despite widespread
warrantless surveillance, prosecutors from this era did not knowingly
introduce evidence from any warrantless bug or tap at trial.229 The
total number of prosecutions this disrupted is unclear, since the
government acknowledged some unidentified cases remained in "cold
storage" due to evidentiary issues posed by the pure intelligence
rule.230 The cases identified here, however, show that the rule was
more than a theoretical exercise, and the Fourth Amendment
remained an influential force in national security matters.
Since the postwar and Cold War periods studied here, the
government has occasionally strayed from the pure intelligence rule.
During the espionage prosecution of Truong Dinh Hung (mentioned
above) and his accomplice, Ronald Humphrey, prosecutors in the
Carter Administration proffered evidence obtained through
warrantless mail searches and electronic surveillance. The Fourth
Circuit accepted the evidence on the theory that the "primary purpose"
of the investigation was nonprosecutorial. 231 In 2000, the government
submitted evidence against al Qaeda member Wadih El-Hage
228. This attitude predated the early security investigation period reviewed here. Katyal &
Caplan, supra note 8, at 1038 (noting that during run-up to World War II, "[t]he lack of specific
legal authority for such FBI intelligence investigations does not appear to have been a concern to
FDR or Hoover").
229. The ratio of identified-to-prosecuted spies during this period is similarly disparate.
HAYNES & KLEHR, supra note 21, at 11 ("Historical evidence that has become available since the
end of the Cold War shows that several hundred Americans spied for the Soviet Union, but only
a fraction of these, several dozen, were ever prosecuted."). Two scholars attribute the meager
prosecutorial number partially to "bitterly disputed evidence that continued to be challenged as
tainted for years after the trials." Id.
230. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
231. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980).
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gathered from a warrantless search and wiretap of his Kenyan
home.2 3 2 And in 2004, the government presented to a grand jury
evidence gleaned from the warrantless search of the Mississippi home
of Abdelhaleem Ashqar, who was later indicted for his support of
Hamas. 233
These cases, however, constitute exceptions to general practice.
The Truong case was the first deviation from the pure intelligence
rule since World War II. Since then, less than a half-dozen national
security cases have involved evidence from warrantless Fourth
Amendment techniques. 234 Out of thousands of investigations and
hundreds of trials, only the rarest national security case has involved
evidence from warrantless surveillance or searches. 235 Similarly, as
described below, the Justice Department has not used information
obtained from the government's modern warrantless surveillance
programs in subsequent trials. 236
In those few exceptions to the pure intelligence rule, courts
have admitted evidence obtained without a warrant on a basis other
than the national security exception. In the El-Hage case, for example,
the Second Circuit avoided the national security exception altogether,
instead deciding the case based on the Fourth Amendment's
applicability outside the United States. 237 Similarly, in the Ashqar
case, the district court concluded suppression was unnecessary based
on a mixed rationale of good faith and the fact that Congress had,
subsequent to the search, imposed a warrant requirement for domestic
physical searches, essentially mooting the relevance of the
constitutional question at hand.238
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, the one decision to
squarely permit the prosecutorial use of information collected
pursuant to the national security exception, has been much maligned.
232. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
233. United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 778 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see also Michael
Higgins, Palestinian Found in Contempt Gets 11 Years, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/22/nation/na-activist22 (reporting Ashqar's sentence for
contempt); Dan Eggen & Jerry Markon, Hamas Leader, 2 Others Indicted, WASH. POST, Aug. 21,
2004, at A4.
234. In addition to Truong Dinh Hung, Bin Laden, and Marzook, see also United States v.
Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding suppression of evidence from warrantless
wiretap was constitutionally unnecessary).
235. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 291-294 and accompanying text.
237. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 171-72 (2d Cir.
2008) (noting "[t]he District Court's recognition of an exception to the warrant requirement for
foreign intelligence searches" but "declin[ing] to adopt this view'); Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at
788-91.
238. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 788-91.
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One federal court recently concluded that Truong imposed "an
'unstable, unrealistic, and confusing' line" in establishing its primary
purpose test.239 Government efforts to comply with the primary
purpose test-an arrangement known as the "FISA wall"-led to
allegations of intelligence failures and hampered various high-profile
investigations, including surveillance of the September 11
attackers. 240 Moreover, Truong entirely ignored the extensive record of
past executive practice-a record that served as the context to the
Supreme Court's opinions in Katz and Keith.241 Truong therefore does
not outweigh the decades of "gloss" generated by the practice of
executive branch officials, as recounted in this Article. The next Part
of this Article discusses the precedential relevance of this prolonged
practice, particularly within the context of the surveillance programs
facing legal challenges today.
IV. THE MODERN RELEVANCE OF EARLY SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
As demonstrated above, national security investigations
proceeded under a pronounced limit for decades. Under this paradigm,
federal agents conducted thousands of wiretapping, bugging, black
bag, and mail-chamfering operations but only used the collected
information for intelligence, as opposed to evidentiary, purposes.
Records show that this limited use resulted from decisions by the
executive branch's leadership to keep such information out of
courtrooms and to halt prosecutions apparently tainted by these
techniques, in keeping with Fourth Amendment strictures. In sum,
the historical record shows a longstanding Fourth Amendment
exception for national security but a similarly longstanding
circumscription of information gleaned from such searches.
This Part considers the relevance of early executive practice to
modern debates about the Fourth Amendment and national security.
239. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551
F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (FISA Ct.
Rev. 2002)).
240. The "FISA wall" refers to procedures installed by the Justice Department and
intelligence community to avoid claims that the executive branch abused FISA authorities as an
end-run around the constitutional and statutory restraints on run-of-the-mill law enforcement.
The procedures essentially cleaved the FBI into two different bodies-intelligence and law
enforcement-and restricted the flow of information-sharing between the two. See generally
David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 487 (2006).
241. Instead, Truong Dinh Hung concluded cursorily that evidence must be admissible
because "almost all foreign intelligence investigations are in part criminal investigations."
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980). As shown here, that
statement is incorrect.
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First, this Part evaluates the legal significance of the pure intelligence
rule and its policy merits as a method for regulating the executive
branch. It then juxtaposes modern surveillance programs-
particularly those now authorized by FISA-against the surveillance
operations of the pure intelligence era.
A. The Legal and Practical Merits of Pure Intelligence
The national security exception and the pure intelligence rule
both have ongoing relevance in modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. This Section examines the place of both doctrines
within the modern legal and policy landscape.
1. National Security, Pure Intelligence, and Special Needs
Sometimes legal debates and practices of the past lose their
importance as a doctrine evolves over time. In this domain, however,
the interlocking rules that governed early national security cases-the
national security exception and the pure intelligence rule-dovetail
with modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As discussed above,
national security (more commonly referred to now as "foreign
intelligence") has become a "recognized exception" to Fourth
Amendment rules.242
Likewise, the pure intelligence rule has equal jurisprudential
relevance, particularly in the context of the "special needs" doctrine.
The special needs doctrine holds that "a judicial warrant and probable
cause are not needed where the search or seizure is justified by special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 243 As discussed
in Part I, national security investigations extend beyond basic law-
enforcement objectives by serving military, diplomatic, and other
policymaking functions; and prosecutions are, as a matter of course, a
relatively rare outcome of such investigations. 24 4 Various scholarly
proposals have therefore suggested treating national security as a
subset of special needs. 245 Some recent judicial opinions also link the
national security exception to special needs. In 2002, the FISA Court
242. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
243. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2011) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing security investigations'
objectives).
245. See Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 777-78 (2004) (suggesting courts uphold suspicionless counterterrorism
searches based on special needs); Birkenstock, supra note 61, at 843 (proposing special needs as
justification for warrantless wiretapping in security investigations).
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of Review-a specialized court established to deal with FISA-related
matters-detailed the parallels between security investigations and
special needs searches. 246 Similarly, in 2008, the same court concluded
that national security and special needs were "comparable
exception[s]," excusing the warrant requirement. 247
Treating national security as akin to a "special need" also
bolsters the pure intelligence rule's relevance. In many special needs
cases outside the security context, courts have found governmental
practices analogous to the pure intelligence rule to be constitutionally
probative. For example, the Supreme Court noted that the drug-
testing program challenged in the hallmark special needs case
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab limited the use of its
results to nonprosecutorial purposes: employees who tested positive
for narcotics were fired, but regulations forbid handing the results "to
any other agency, including criminal prosecutors, without the
employee's written consent."248 In Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton, a school drug-testing case, the Supreme Court noted in finding
the searches reasonable that "the results of the [drug] tests are
disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to
know; and they are not turned over to law-enforcement authorities or
used for any internal disciplinary function."249 The Supreme Court has
therefore found governmental self-restraint in the use of the collected
evidence to be probative in evaluating Fourth Amendment challenges.
Conversely, when drug-testing results are used in subsequent
prosecutions, the judiciary imposes greater scrutiny and has found
certain searches to violate the Fourth Amendment. In Ferguson v. City
of Charleston, a state hospital tested women receiving prenatal
treatment for narcotics use; prosecutors used some positive results in
subsequent trials.250 On appeal, the Supreme Court struck down the
program, which the state government sought to justify on special
needs grounds. The majority concluded that the involvement of law
enforcement rendered the program unconstitutional. "While the
ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women in
question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the
immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law-
enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal," the majority
246. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745-46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
247. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551
F.3d 1004, 1010-11 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
248. 489 U.S. 656, 662 (1989).
249. 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); see also In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1010 (citing Acton).
250. 532 U.S. 67, 70-71 (2001). To support prosecutions, officials amended testing
procedures to establish a chain of custody. Id. at 82.
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concluded.251 "In none of our previous special needs cases have we
upheld the collection of evidence for criminal-law-enforcement
purposes."252
Cases like Acton, Ferguson, and Von Raab indicate how
prosecutorial use of information affects the constitutional
reasonableness of a search. In the national security context, at least
one court has found prosecutorial restraint to be constitutionally
relevant to a security program's reasonableness. In Mac Wade v. Kelly,
the Second Circuit evaluated New York City's subway search program
imposed after the 2005 London tube bombings.253 The opinion, while
describing the program and assessing its constitutionality, noted that
the government had not used the searches to pursue normal law-
enforcement purposes. "[T]hus far there have been no arrests for
general crimes stemming from the seizure of non-explosive contraband
discovered during a search conducted pursuant to the [subway search]
Program," the court noted favorably. 254 The court ultimately upheld
the search because "preventing a terrorist attack on the subway is a
special need" and "even though the searches intrude on a full privacy
interest, they do so to a minimal degree."2 55
These special needs cases, in and out of the security context,
establish that the pure intelligence rule can fit comfortably within
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 256 Nonprosecutorial rules
and practices have informed judicial inquiries about the constitutional
reasonableness of government searches. Even if the special needs
doctrine does not go so far as to totally preclude the prosecutorial use
of evidence obtained from warrantless security searches, these
decisions indicate that such governmental conduct is nonetheless
constitutionally relevant.
2. The Incentives of the Pure Intelligence Rule
Aside from its legal significance, the pure intelligence rule
promises significant practical benefits. This Section briefly discusses
how the pure intelligence rule incentivizes restraint by the executive
251. Id. at 82-83 (internal citation omitted).
252. Id. at 83 n.20.
253. 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).
254. Id. at 265 n.1.
255. Id. at 275.
256. The national security exception predates the "special needs" doctrine and so can be
thought of as analytically distinct from special needs jurisprudence. Indeed, national security
investigations implicate constitutional powers of the president in ways that school searches and
drug testing do not. However, for those who wish to fold national security searches within the
existing special needs jurisprudence, the pure intelligence rule still holds relevance.
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without unnecessarily compromising the efficacy of national security
investigations.
In general, the pure intelligence rule reduces the costliness of
national security surveillance upon law-abiding citizens. As Edward
Levi testified in 1975, the price of a "[g]overnment intrusion on
individual security is a function ... of disclosure and of the use to
which its product is put"; a search's effect on the searched is "perhaps
greatest when it is employed or can be employed to impose criminal
sanctions."257 Arrest, conviction, and imprisonment-whether imposed
on the innocent or the guilty-are some of the highest costs the state
can impose upon the citizenry.258 Circumscribing the prosecutorial
uses of intelligence reduces the frequency with which these costs are
generated, thereby minimizing the impact of security investigations
on the nation.
Additionally, the pure intelligence rule eliminates the incentive
for officers to use the national security exception for law-enforcement
purposes. As any information collected under the pure intelligence
rule is inadmissible in court, such searches serve little purpose to law-
enforcement agents focused on prosecution. The pure intelligence rule
therefore guards against the pretextual use of security investigations
as a means of sidestepping the traditional warrant and probable cause
requirements. Reinforcing traditional Fourth Amendment protections,
the pure intelligence rule also reduces the number of overall searches
as well as the number of "empty searches"-searches of innocent
citizens-by limiting law-enforcement searches to cases where the
government can establish predicate suspicion. Empty searches impose
significant costs upon law-abiding persons (lost time, damages to
personal property, loss of bodily integrity, dignity costs, damage to
reputation, etc.), and the government should take particular care to
protect against such errors.259
The pure intelligence rule also helps elucidate how the criminal
justice system functions as a dual-use tool, serving both security and
nonsecurity purposes. In addition to the government's more
traditional national security tools-diplomacy, sanctions, military
257. Levi, Church Committee Testimony, supra note 18, at 78. Errant arrests and false
convictions have extraordinary costs, and national security investigations do not have a perfect
record. See Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033 (D. Or. 2007) (describing arrest
of innocent citizen mistakenly identified as terrorist).
258. See, e.g., Harry J. Holzer, Collateral Costs: Effects of Incarceration on Employment and
Earnings Among Young Works, in Do PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? 249-51 (Steven Raphael &
Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009) (surveying incarceration's effects on wages and employment).
259. See L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding
Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1526-27 (2011) (discussing empty searches and related costs).
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options, and so on-the government must also be sensitive to the fact
that prosecuting foreign threats can have unintended nonsecurity
implications. 2 60 Because criminal law and criminal procedure operate
under the "transsubstantive" principles that "treat[] one crime just
like another," accommodation of national security prosecutions can
generate a variety of nonsecurity externalities. 261 Some commentators,
for example, allege that the judiciary relaxed the probable cause
standard omnipresent in criminal procedure in the wake of the
September 11 attacks out of a fear that a more robust standard would
stifle counterterrorism efforts.262  Rules that cabin security
investigations from traditional law-enforcement operations reduce the
chances of legal seepage-seepage that risks the erosion of civil
liberties in situations beyond those directly involving national security
threats.
Of course, the pure intelligence rule is susceptible to a variety
of complaints. Civil libertarians could argue that the rule, by itself,
does not go far enough to minimize the costs of national security
investigations. Even without the prospect of conviction or
incarceration, searches impose a variety of dignitary harms,
reputational injuries, and other costs, which the pure intelligence rule
does little to minimize. From the other side of the aisle, security-
minded commentators might note that the merits of the pure
intelligence rule do not necessarily outweigh the effectiveness of
criminal trials as a national security tool. As many politicians and
260. Developments in nonsecurity sectors carry "security externalities." See Joanne Gowa &
Edward D. Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 408 (1993)
(outlining "security externalities"); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003)
(discussing affirmative action's military effect). The converse-that security operations have
nonsecurity implications-is equally true.
261. Stuntz, Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, supra note 29, at 847.
Transsubstantivity's strong form argues there is no security exception. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that "spies and saboteurs are
as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers'). The Fourth
Amendment's "transsubstantivity" has come under heavy fire over the years as leading to
inefficient levels of policing. See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth
Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1673 (1998) (observing that "the Court
has tended to overlook substantive matters in evaluating the reasonableness of a challenged
search or seizure"); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027,
1046 (1974) (proposing that the exclusionary rule "not apply in the most serious cases," such as
murder and other violent crimes); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81
TEX. L. REV. 951, 1015 (2003) (championing alternative to viewing probable cause as "single and
inflexible standard'); Stuntz, Policing After the Terror, supra note 29, at 2146 (arguing that
Fourth Amendment law should ensure that "in containing the predators, we do not make for
even worse predation").
262. See Stuntz, Policing After the Terror, supra note 29, at 2157-58 (discussing Court's
deferential attitude in United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002), a Fourth Amendment case
heard by the Supreme Court closely after the September 2001 attacks).
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scholars have explained, the criminal justice system can assist general
counterterrorism and counterespionage efforts by neutralizing foreign
agents and deterring future ones. 263 Reducing the amount of
admissible evidence inevitably cuts into the usefulness of prosecutions
as a national security tool.
Even with these objections duly noted, the pure intelligence
rule regulates security investigations with a clear and appreciable
logic. Restricting the government's access to the criminal system in
certain security cases installs practical protections for law-abiding
persons and avoids some of the largest costs that government searches
can generate. Conversely, the pure intelligence rule takes one manner
of response from the government's arsenal but leaves others-no-fly
lists, visa bans, interdictions, and so on-intact. The rule also does not
blind the executive; rather it allows the executive to identify foreign
threats and respond. With its practicality and vintage, the pure
intelligence rule holds precedential importance, a subject to which this
Article now turns.
B. The Constitutional Gloss of the Pure Intelligence Rule
As noted above, the executive's historical practice offers a
"gloss" for understanding the scope of its constitutionally permissible
and impermissible conduct. 264 Similarly, government officials have
explicitly defended modern security surveillance programs by
reference to historical practice, 265 but these arguments either overlook
or ignore the executive's enduring adherence to the pure intelligence
rule. This Article closes by considering how the gloss of the pure
intelligence era should affect our view of modern surveillance
programs.
To determine the relevance of earlier practice, this Article
examines two modern surveillance programs, both authorized under
FISA. The first involves the use of judicially issued "intelligence
warrants" and the prosecutorial use of information derived therefrom.
This practice recently prompted a spate of litigation, particularly after
the PATRIOT Act amended the scheme in 2001. The second
263. Many have noted the usefulness of prosecutions as a counterterrorism and
counterespionage tool. See, e.g., Kris, supra note 1, at 605 ("While our criminal justice system has
limits . . . when it is the right [counterterrorism] tool it has an exceptional success rate."); Press
Release, President Barack Obama on the Passage of H.R. 6523 (Jan. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president-hr-1540 ("The prose-
cution of terrorists in Federal court is a powerful tool in our efforts to protect the Nation and
must be among the options available to us.").
264. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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surveillance program involves warrantless electronic surveillance of
suspects believed to be overseas; this surveillance is authorized under
section 702 of FISA, added by statute in 2008. This new program is
the subject of pending lawsuits challenging its constitutionality under
the Fourth Amendment.
1. Intelligence Warrants and Intelligence-Based Prosecutions
National security investigations changed dramatically in 1978
when Congress passed the first iteration of FISA (now known as Title
I of FISA). FISA requires that electronic surveillance during security
investigations be conducted pursuant to judicial authorization. 266 To
handle the particular needs of security investigations, FISA also
established a new "intelligence warrant" regime by creating a
specialized federal court called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. The court is authorized to issue a warrant if there is probable
cause to believe that a targeted suspect is a foreign power or its
agent.267
FISA also provides that the government can use evidence
collected pursuant to intelligence warrants in subsequent criminal
trials. FISA contemplates that the government may "enter into
evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial . . . information
obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance" conducted
pursuant to an intelligence warrant.268 Over the last thirty years,
FISA warrants have become a common source for evidence in security
cases, with prosecutors introducing the results of FISA-authorized
surveillance in various terrorism, espionage, and other security
cases.269 Defendants, in turn, have lodged a slew of constitutional
challenges to the use of FISA-derived evidence at trial.270
266. 50 U.S.C. § 1812 (2012) (describing extent to which FISA "shall be the exclusive means
by which electronic surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic
communications may be conducted). In 1994, that requirement was extended to physical
searches conducted in the course of national security investigations, a requirement now found in
Title III of FISA. Id. § 1825.
267. Id. § 1804.
268. Id. § 1806(c).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Hovsepian, No. CR 82-917, 1985 WL 5970, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 25, 1985); United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1182 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United
States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1307-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. El-
Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 563 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Abu-Jihad, 630 F.3d 102, 117 (2d Cir.
2010) (listing Fourth Amendment challenges); United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir.
2009); United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 993 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hammoud,
381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 1993);
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Some may argue the practice of early security investigations
suggests that the prosecutorial use of FISA-derived information runs
afoul of the Fourth Amendment; however, the prolonged adherence to
the pure intelligence rule must be viewed in the context of the
searches it regulated. During the early era studied in Part III, federal
officials conducted national security investigations without any
judicial supervision or warrant procedures. When Congress
occasionally proposed imposing a warrant requirement on national
security investigations during this period, the executive branch
successfully opposed those bills by arguing that judicial review would
compromise national security."' At the same time, executive officials
conceded that some curb on security investigations was
constitutionally (and politically) necessary; the solution was the pure
intelligence rule. That rule, in other words, was intended to regulate
warrantless surveillance and searches, and the practice helped avoid
judicial review. Imposing a warrant requirement upon certain security
investigations, as Title I of FISA does, reduces the need for self-
regulation like the pure intelligence rule.27 2
The significance of the distinction between warrant and
warrantless searches is highlighted by the Supreme Court's Keith
opinion, which addressed both types of searches separately. The Court
considered the scope of permissible warrantless surveillance in
national security investigations but ultimately refrained from opining
on "the scope of the President's surveillance power with respect to the
activities of foreign powers, within or without this country"-though,
as described in Part III.C, the executive interpreted the Court's
agnosticism as a blessing of the exception.273 The Keith opinion,
however, also discussed the possibility of intelligence warrants, which
the Court determined satisfy, rather than sidestep, the Warrant
United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d
1458, 1462 (11th Cir. 1987).
271. For example, Congress repeatedly proposed relaxing section 605's prosecutorial bar on
wiretapping evidence, provided the executive seek warrants before wiretapping. See EDWARD V.
LONG, THE INTRUDERS 147-55 (1966) (describing wiretapping bills between 1929 and 1966,
including warrant proposals). The FBI and Justice Department responded that "they would
rather have no bill [admitting wiretapping evidence] than one requiring a court order." Milton
Magruder, House Action Expected Today on Wiretap Measure, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1954, at 8.
Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower's Attorney General, explained later, "I also favored the
admissibility of evidence obtained from wiretaps in criminal cases, but I was willing to forgo its
use in court if that was necessary so that electronic surveillance in intelligence cases [i.e.,
warrantless wiretaps] could continue." BROWNELL & BURKE, supra note 123, at 233.
272. The same analysis applied to Title III of FISA, which extends the intelligence-warrant
requirement to physical searches. See supra note 4.
273. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972); see also supra notes
207-08 (describing lower court interpretations of Katz and Keith).
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Clause's requirements. The Court clarified that, apart from the Fourth
Amendment's national security exception, "[d]ifferent standards" for
intelligence warrants "may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate
need of Government for intelligence information and the protected
rights of our citizens."274
Similarly, part of FISA's initial appeal to lawmakers was the
prospect of using electronic surveillance as trial evidence. In notes
from a Situation Room briefing in March 1976 about the prospect of
surveillance legislation, Edward Levi (whose support for such
legislation was politically vital) 2 75 listed the "[p]ros" of supporting the
new warrant bill. The first pro noted that the "[r]equirement of [a]
warrant for surveillance" in security investigations would "eliminate(]
question[s] of validity of [the] evidence obtained." 276 In other words,
Levi recognized that in exchange for judicial review, prosecutorial use
of wiretapping and bugging would be possible. His notes show how
FISA's warrant requirement resulted from some horse trading:
prosecutorial use of information in exchange for greater oversight over
security investigations.
Given this historical and legal context, the FISA intelligence-
warrant scheme is constitutionally defensible without relying on the
Fourth Amendment's national security exception, which excuses,
rather than satisfies, the warrant requirement. The use of evidence
from intelligence warrants, therefore, is a distinguishable, but not
inconsistent, practice compared to that of the earlier eras examined in
this Article. The gloss of the pure intelligence era, therefore, does not
undermine the prosecutorial use of information gleaned from FISA's
intelligence warrants.
2. Warrantless Searches and Modern Pure Intelligence Practice
Not all modern surveillance has been conducted pursuant to
warrants. For example, FISA did not authorize warrants for physical
searches until 1994, so the FBI conducted some physical searches in
the 1990s without judicial authorization. 277 More recently, warrantless
274. Id. at 322-23.
275. Though FISA was not passed until 1978, after Levi's tenure as Attorney General, his
endorsement was nonetheless vital. See Funk, supra note 15, at 1111-12 (describing Levi's role
in passage of FISA).
276. Talking Points from Meeting Regarding Legislation on Electronic Surveillance for
Foreign Intelligence Purposes 1 (Mar. 12, 1976), available at http://www.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/
NSAEBBINSAEBB178/surv8b.pdf.
277. Government agents, for example, searched Aldrich Ames's home without a warrant
during an espionage investigation in 1993. S. REP. No. 103-296, at 40 (1994). Today, FISA
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surveillance has become a significant part of major counterterrorism
operations. The Terrorist Surveillance Program, for instance, allegedly
collected thousands of transnational calls without judicial approval. 278
And while FISA initially authorized only surveillance pursuant to a
warrant, Congress recently amended the statute to permit certain
warrantless surveillance. Today that authorization is found in section
702 of FISA, added through the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
("FA").279
In many important respects, modern warrantless surveillance
is analogous to the early national security investigations discussed in
Part III. Like earlier operations, today's warrantless surveillance can
occur without agents first establishing probable cause. Section 702 of
FISA, for example, eliminates the probable cause showing that Titles I
and III of FISA require.280 Instead, section 702 only requires a
"reasonabl[e] belie[fJ" that the target is a non-U.S. person located
outside the United States and that the collection has a foreign
intelligence purpose. 281 Modern warrantless surveillance is also
conducted with minimal judicial review, much like its historical
antecedents. Whereas a court issues FISA warrants based on its
review of an individualized application setting forth the things to be
searched and the predicate suspicion, section 702 does not require the
government to submit such applications for each target of warrantless
surveillance. Instead, section 702 only compels judicial review of the
surveillance program's general protocols for the collection, retention,
and dissemination of information. 282 While these relaxed standards
requires an intelligence warrant for physical searches inside the United States. See supra note
264.
278. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 8, at 1029-34 (describing NSA program). The Author
has no personal knowledge of this program.
279. Pub. L. No. 110-261 § 101, 122 Stat. 2436, 2437 (adding Title VII). For background on
section 702, see Letter from James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, U.S. Dep't of Defense,
and Attorney Gen. Eric A. Holder, Jr. to Representatives John Boehner and Nancy Pelosi and
Senators Harry Reid and Mitch McConnell (Feb. 8, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/
ola/views-letters/1 12/02-08-12-fisa-reauthorization.pdf.
280. Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[Whereas under the
preexisting FISA scheme the FISC had to find probable cause ... under the FAA the FISC no
longer needs to make any probable-cause determination at all.").
281. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). Similarly, the FAA does not require the government to
establish probable cause of a targeted facility's use by the suspect. Id. § 1881a(d). While section
702 reduced the probable cause requirement, other parts of the FAA-specifically sections 703
and 704-expanded the warrant requirement to U.S. persons targeted abroad. Id. §§ 1881b &
1881c.
282. See id. § 1881a(i)(2) (authorizing court to review certification process, targeting
procedures, and minimization procedures); id. § 1881a(i)(3)(A) (compelling judiciary to permit
collection if satisfied targeting, minimization, and certification procedures sufficient); see also
Clapper, 638 F.3d at 124 ('The FAA, in contrast to the preexisting FISA scheme, does not require
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give the government more leeway in investigating foreign threats,
there is little question that such surveillance programs do not satisfy
the Warrant Clause (even under the relaxed Keith standard) and
therefore must fall within some exception to that clause. 2 83
In recent years, the government's warrantless surveillance
programs have faced robust constitutional challenges, and courts have
reached different conclusions. Shortly after the government's Terrorist
Surveillance Program was revealed in 2005, the ACLU and others
filed a lawsuit challenging the program's constitutionality. The
litigation was eventually dismissed on standing grounds, but not
before a district court issued an opinion finding the program
"obviously in violation of the Fourth Amendment."284 In contrast,
another warrantless surveillance regime established by the FAA's
predecessor, the Protect America Act of 2007, was upheld by the FISA
Court of Review in 2008.285 That court concluded such surveillance did
not violate the Fourth Amendment because it fell within the "foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement."286
Such litigation continues: in 2013, the Supreme Court issued a
five-to-four decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, in
which the litigants challenged the constitutionality of section 702 on
Fourth Amendment grounds. 287 The Clapper plaintiffs were "attorneys
and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations whose work
allegedly requires them to engage in sensitive and sometimes
privileged telephone and e-mail communications with colleagues,
clients, sources, and other individuals located abroad."288 None of the
plaintiffs had any definitive evidence that they had actually been
overheard through section 702 surveillance. Rather, their standing
claim was based on allegations that they had to take precautions-
the government to submit an individualized application ... identifying the particular targets or
facilities to be monitored.").
283. See In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
551 F.3d 1004, 1010-11 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (assuming Protect America Act did not satisfy
Warrant Clause).
284. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated by 493 F.3d 644 (6th
Cir. 2007). The district court concluded that the program was unreasonable because it lacked
"prior-existing probable cause, as well as particularity as to persons, places, and things, and the
interposition of a neutral magistrate between Executive branch enforcement officers and
citizens." Id.
285. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1008. This case involved a service provider that refused to
assist the government's warrantless surveillance of a foreign target, alleging that the
surveillance, though statutorily authorized, violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1008.
286. Id. at 1012, 1016.
287. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
288. Id. at 1145.
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avoiding electronic communications, taking meetings in person rather
than teleconferencing, and so on-on the chance that their
conversations would be monitored.289 Five Justices, however, found
these grounds too "highly speculative" to establish standing and
dismissed the claim, overturning the Second Circuit decision.290
All of these cases highlight one important parallel between
early and recent warrantless surveillance: information from modern
warrantless programs remains limited to nonprosecutorial purposes.
In Clapper, for example, the plaintiffs conceded that "[a]s far as [they
were] aware, the government has yet to introduce FAA-derived
evidence in a criminal trial, though four years have passed since the
statute was signed into law."2 9 1 The Clapper majority implicitly
acknowledged this fact but rejected the argument that the potential
"insulation" of government surveillance was a reason to find standing
for the plaintiffs. 292 Similarly, in ACLU v. National Security Agency,
litigation challenging the Bush Administration's Terrorist
Surveillance Program, the Sixth Circuit noted "that the [National
Security Agency] has not disclosed or disseminated any of the
information obtained via this warrantless wiretapping." 293 There was
no evidence, Chief Judge Batchelder noted, that any surveillance had
been used in criminal prosecutions or other analogous proceedings. 294
These and similar observations suggest that modern warrantless
surveillance programs, like the early investigations described above,
have followed a pure intelligence rule.
Modern adherence to the pure intelligence rule appears to be
more de facto practice than affirmative policy (much like the initial
postwar years described above).295 The government has not
acknowledged any evidentiary self-circumscription in the conduct of
its warrantless surveillance programs, as it did in the 1960s in the
Black and Schipani briefs.296 Nor is the government statutorily
prohibited from using such information in criminal proceedings; the
289. Id. at 1146.
290. Id. at 1148.
291. Brief for Respondents at 58, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. 11-1025), 2012 WL 4361439,
at *58. Similarly, during oral arguments before the Supreme Court, plaintiffs' counsel argued
that "the government has made clear that it's not going to" use section 702 evidence in a criminal
trial because "the main purpose of this statute is not to gather evidence for law enforcement."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-43, Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (No. 11-1025).
292. 133 S. Ct. at 1154.
293. 493 F.3d 644, 671 (6th Cir. 2007) (Batchelder, J.).
294. Id. at 653 (noting plaintiffs did not allege use of surveillance information in "criminal
prosecution, deportation, administrative inquiry, [or] civil litigation").
295. See supra Part III.A.
296. See supra Part III.C.1.
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FAA explicitly permits the prosecutorial use of information from
warrantless surveillance. 297 On the other hand, the United States did
not challenge the plaintiffs' description of the government's (non)use
of section 702 information in Clapper. Similarly, this Author's review
has found no record of the United States notifying a defendant of the
government's intention to use section 702 information in a criminal or
similar proceeding, as statutorily mandated. 298 Because modern
warrantless surveillance programs date back to at least 2002 (with the
initiation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program), publicly available
evidence suggests that the government's administration of these
programs has followed the pure intelligence rule for over a decade. 299
Just as the government's self-restraint during earlier national
security investigations strengthened its claims of compliance with the
Constitution, the government's restraint today should factor into
Fourth Amendment evaluations of modern warrantless surveillance
programs. As described above, adherence to the pure intelligence rule
reduces the intrusiveness of national security surveillance upon law-
abiding citizens. 300 Similarly, following the pure intelligence rule
guards against pretextual use of national security investigations,
indicating the government is not using the new provisions of FISA to
ease its traditional law-enforcement duties. When balancing the
government and privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment,
these factors support the constitutionality of national security
surveillance.
Even without the government acknowledging any evidentiary
self-circumscription, the empirical absence of information obtained
without a warrant in criminal trials should weigh into the evaluation
of such conduct's constitutional reasonableness. Appellate courts have
weighed similar empirical records. In Mac Wade v. Kelly (the subway
search case), the government did not acknowledge any policy that
297. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881e (2012) (providing that the use of FAA-acquired information shall
be regulated by same judicial procedures outlined in Title I of FISA). Interestingly, the Protect
America Act, which the FAA replaced, did not have any such use provision. See 154 CONG. REC.
S6132 (daily ed. June 25, 2008) (noting section 706 of FAA "fills a void that has existed under the
Protect America Act which had contained no provision governing the use of acquired
intelligence").
298. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881e (requiring notice to defendant when government intends to use
information from section 702 collection in subsequent prosecution).
299. See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 37, at Al (reporting program started in 2002).
300. Adherence to the pure intelligence rule through de facto practice arguably does not
reduce the expected costs of surveillance as much as a formal prohibition would, since the
government could more easily reverse itself when there is no formal policy committing an
executive to a course of action. On the other hand, governments frequently follow the practice of
predecessors, and even formal policies can be reversed.
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precluded prosecution. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found the
government's prosecutorial record-namely, that information from the
subway searches had not been admitted as evidence-to be
probative.30 1 Adherence to the pure intelligence rule, therefore, is
relevant regardless of whether the practice is ad hoc or the result of
explicit policy.
The government's self-restraint to date is similar to its conduct
throughout much of the Cold War. Relative to decades of earlier
practice, in fact, the government's security operations are significantly
more restrained: the government follows standardized protocols for
the collection, retention, and dissemination of information; it clears
these procedures with the judiciary before initiating surveillance; and
its surveillance under section 702 only targets non-U.S. citizens
believed to be outside the United States (although that is not to say
that U.S. citizens within the United States are not incidentally
overheard). 302 In contrast, the historical record shows that early use of
warrantless investigative techniques-bugging, black bag jobs, mail
chamfering, and later, wiretapping-were all pervasively used against
U.S.-based targets without any judicial oversight and with fewer
protocols designed to protect privacy interests than today. Viewed in
light of these precedents, then, the government has a strong case that
its current warrantless surveillance programs are constitutionally
reasonable. 303
Similarly, whatever the merits of the Clapper majority's
opinion vis-A-vis the standing doctrine, Clapper permits the executive
branch to continue foreign surveillance as a practical matter, as long
as it continues to adhere to a de facto pure intelligence rule. Clapper
does not afford the executive a bold new opportunity to infringe on the
liberties of its citizens; rather, the decision simply allows the
government to continue foreign surveillance in the same fashion it has
conducted such surveillance for over seventy years. In light of the
301. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 265 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006); see also supra notes 251-53 and
accompanying text (discussing Mac Wade).
302. The Court of Review, for example, noted that Section 702 instituted a "matrix of
safeguards" to constrain executive conduct, including "targeting procedures, minimization
procedures, a procedure to ensure that a significant purpose of a surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information, procedures incorporated through Executive Order 12333 § 2.5, and
[redacted] procedures [redacted] outlined in an affidavit supporting the certifications." In re
Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004,
1013 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
303. Of course, if federal prosecutors suddenly alter course and utilize evidence from
warrantless surveillance programs at trial, this historical parallelism would become moot. Title
VII permits the prosecutorial use of information from warrantless surveillance, so no statutory
bar to such use exists. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881e.
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historical practice outlined in this Article, the Clapper decision can be
viewed as a substantive decision to maintain the general parameters
for national security investigations that have existed since
World War II.
But while Clapper permits such surveillance to continue, it also
incentivizes the government to use warrantless surveillance sparingly.
There remains great uncertainty about the constitutionality of using
such warrantless information in court as well as opinions from
multiple attorneys general questioning its constitutionality, so the
government could not use such information without placing its
warrantless surveillance tools in great jeopardy. The majority decision
in Clapper therefore effectively corrals the government's warrantless
surveillance policies and encourages the use of intelligence warrants
whenever possible, given their established constitutionality. In short,
Clapper maintains the same balance of liberty and security that has
existed since World War II, one that affords a real role for the Fourth
Amendment during national security investigations.
This analysis about prosecutorial practice to date does not
necessarily mean that the government is prohibited from ever using
warrantless information in a future prosecution. Indeed, the executive
branch may decide that new threats of state-sponsored terrorism and
cyber-based attacks require a new prosecutorial strategy using all the
evidence available to the government, including FAA-acquired
information. Should such a case arise, courts would have to assess
whether the Fourth Amendment is satisfied by merely the FAA's
targeting and minimization procedures, which strictly define the
individuals who may be targeted under the FAA and the retention
procedure for information gathered through FAA surveillance. From a
historical perspective, the question to be asked is whether the FAA
imposes sufficient constraints on government surveillance comparable
to the pure intelligence rule.
At minimum, however, this Article establishes that it would be
difficult to throw out the FAA in its entirety as unconstitutional since
the first five years of its operation have so closely echoed decades of
practice dating back to World War 11.304 Executive practice during the
last half-decade, along with that over the preceding seventy years,
demonstrates there are solutions that both honor the Fourth
304. For example, even if a court found that the prosecutorial use of FAA-acquired
information was not permissible under the Fourth Amendment, it could simply strike down 50
U.S.C. § 1881e, which governs the prosecutorial use of FAA-acquired information in a trial, and
leave the rest of the FAA statute intact. That severability approach is bolstered by the fact that,
as noted above, § 1811e was added after the initial passage of the first FAA-like procedures
(those found within the Protect America Act). See supra note 297 (discussing § 1881e).
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Amendment and afford the executive wide discretion to collect
information related to national security threats.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article shows that the FBI, the Justice Department, and
others in the executive branch have long recognized that the Fourth
Amendment plays a role in national security operations. While the
Fourth Amendment is flexible enough to accommodate the
peculiarities of national security investigations, such flexibility still
requires clear limits on executive power in order to protect civil
liberties. The pure intelligence rule described in this Article and that
the executive branch followed for decades struck such a compromise.
The pure intelligence rule is also defensible on doctrinal and policy
grounds, for it installs genuine protections for law-abiding persons
while permitting the government to continue to collect intelligence-
the lifeblood of national security operations.
In the end, the criminal justice system's usefulness as a
national security tool must be a function of, rather than a factor
affecting, the Fourth Amendment. The desire to prosecute cannot
drive an "end-run around the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
warrantless searches," as one court warned in an early FISA case. 305
Nor need it be. As this Article explains, the results of the
government's national security investigations remained out of the
courtroom for over three decades, starting at the end of World War II
and stretching well into the Cold War, in an effort to accommodate
Fourth Amendment protections while maintaining vigilance toward
foreign threats. The government's track record since 2001 indicates
similar restraint, in a way that makes its practice more
constitutionally palatable. Ultimately, then, both historical and
modern experience demonstrate how, even at times of great peril,
constitutional restrictions can maintain the balance between security
and liberty through unique legal frameworks.
305. United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991).
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